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ABSTRACT
CATEGORICAL EVIDENCE, CONFIDENCE AND URGENCY DURING THE
INTEGRATION OF MULTI-FEATURE INFORMATION
The present experiment utilized a temporally-extended categorization task to investigate
the neural substrates underlying our ability to integrate information over time and across
multiple stimulus features. Importantly, the design allowed di↵erentiation of three important
decision functions: 1) categorical evidence, 2) decisional confidence (the choice-inpendent
probability that a decision will lead to a desirable state), and 3) urgency (a hypothetical
signal representing a growing pressure to produce a behavioral response within each trial). In
conjunction with model-based fMRI, the temporal evolution of these variables were tracked as
participants deliberated about impending choices. The approach allowed investigation of the
independent e↵ects of urgency across the brain, and also the investigation of how urgency
might modulate representations of categorical evidence and confidence. Representations
associated with prediction errors during feedback were also investigated. Many cortical and
striatal somatomotor regions tracked the dynamical evolution of categorical evidence, while
many regions of the dorsal and ventral attention networks (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002)
tracked decisional confidence and uncertainty. Urgency influenced activity in regions known
to be associated with flexible control of the speed-accuracy trade-o↵ (particularly the pre-
SMA and striatum), and additionally modulated representations of categorical evidence and
confidence. The results, therefore, link the urgency signal to two hypothetical mechanisms
underling flexible control of decision thresholding (Bogacz et al., 2010): gain modulation of
the striatal thresholding circuitry, and gain modulation of the integrated categorical evidence.
ii
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Decision making can be characterized as a deliberative process that involves weighing
noisy samples of evidence for competing hypotheses until committing to a choice. For in-
stance, when deciding about the direction in which a field of dots is moving, a decision maker
must integrate information over time (Figure 1.1.A). Many real-world decisions additionally
require decision makers to integrate information from di↵erent information sources according
to their estimated reliability. For instance, after training participants to categorize circular
sine-wave gratings into the two categories shown in Figure 1.1.B, we would expect that they
would place heavy weight on the frequency dimension while tending to ignore orientation.
Real-world decisions, of course, tend to be more complex. First, they tend to be higher-
dimensional (e.g., categorical decisions such as “car” vs. “bike” sometimes require decision
makers to consider more than “number of wheels;” e.g., Figure 1.1.C). Second, many features
provide only probabilistic information. For instance, while dogs tend to be larger than cats,
this is not always the case. To be able to reliably classify these kinds of complex stimuli,
decision-makers must generally adopt strategies where they average informational content
across multiple stimulus dimensions and across time.
It can often be advantageous, however, to reduce the dimensionality of complex problems
by considering only a subset of the information. This has the well-known e↵ect of reducing
computational demands, and can sometimes improve decisional accuracy (Gigerenzer and
Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Guyon and Elissee↵, 2003; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). Real-world demands often additionally require decision-makers to com-
promise accuracy in order to respond quickly, a phenomenon known as the speed-accuracy
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Figure 1.1. Categorization Task Examples. A) In the random dot motion
task (Downing and Movshon, 1989), participants categorize fields of moving
dots based on the overall direction of motion in the array. The di culty
of individual trials is inversely proportional to proportion of dots moving in
a coherent direction. B) An example of a “rule-based” categorization task,
where categories are defined according the frequency of sine-wave stimuli, and
where the orientation of the individual exemplars does not provide reliable
categorical information. Example stimuli are presented to the right and left
of the plot illustrating the bivariate category distributions. C) An ambiguous
bike-car stimulus. ( A) is adapted from Downing and Movshon 1989, and B)
is adapted from Smith et al. 2012)
trade-o↵ (SAT). For instance, although the consequences of either choice might be unknown,
a skier heading for a tree must commit to turn left or right within a limited period of time.
In order to make advantageous decisions within such environments, decision makers must
keep track of the probability that each choice will lead to a desirable state, and they must
also track the time available to respond. Finally, in complex environments, decision-makers
must also track their decisional confidence, the choice-independent probability of reaching
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a desirable state. This allows decision-makers to plan sequences of choices in the absence
of feedback, and to determine the value of accumulating additional information (when con-
fidence is low, the value of considering additional information tends to be high). Finally,
confidence also provides a basis for the calculation of reward prediction error, an important
learning signal in the brain (Schultz et al., 1997).
Several lines of investigation suggest that “urgency,” a monotonically-increasing signal
representing an increasing pressure to respond within each trial, may allow decision makers
to commit to choices with successively less evidence as costs associated with deliberation
accrue, or as opportunities for reward decrease (Cisek et al., 2009; Niyogi and Wong-Lin,
2013; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Schultz et al., 1997; Standage et al., 2011; Thura et al.,
2012, 2014; Thura and Cisek, 2014). In the present experiment a temporally-extended ver-
sion of the “weather-prediction” categorization task (Knowlton et al., 1994, 1996), was used
to track the evolution of categorical evidence and decisional confidence as they evolved prior
to commitment, and to investigate how these functions were modulated by urgency. Be-
fore our task and predictions are described in greater detail, several relevant categorization
models are briefly reviewed. These models provide a framework for considering the inte-
gration of information across multiple stimulus dimensions. Particular focus is given to the
COVIS model (Ashby et al., 2011), which currently provides the most biologically-detailed
account of human classification performance. The sequential sampling and attractor-network
classes of decision-making model are then reviewed. These model classes represent powerful
frameworks for understanding how we integrate information over time, and how we thresh-
old our decision processes to determine how much information we should accumulate before
committing to a choice.
3
1.1. Categorization and Attention
The idea of modeling stimuli as a collection of attributes in multidimensional space has
a long history in cognitive psychology. For instance, according to the Shepard-Luce choice
rule (Luce, 1959; Shepard, 1957), a stimulus is represented as a set of points, x, and the
distance between two K-dimensional stimuli (e.g., xi and xj) can be estimated by summing





While this modeling approach provides a good account of the confusion data obtained
from tasks requiring the identification of specific stimuli (where individual stimuli are as-
sociated with individual responses), it provides a poor account of confusion data obtained
from categorization tasks (where groups of stimuli are associated with a common response).
Shepard (1961) interpreted this finding as providing evidence that identification and cate-
gorization are based upon fundamentally di↵erent cognitive principles. This agrees with the
logical assertion that the identification of individual stimuli must require the consideration
of many stimulus dimensions (exemplars must be di↵erentiated from all other stimuli), while
categorization only requires the consideration of those dimensions which di↵erentiate cate-
gory members (exemplars associated with a common response) from non-category members
(exemplars associated with other available response options). Nosofsky (1986), however,
demonstrated that by modifying Equation 1 so that each psychological dimension was mod-
ulated by an attentional weight, wk, the approach could also provide a reasonable account







This simple modification captures another long-standing idea in cognitive science: that
rule-based strategies are equivalent to assigning exclusive attentional weights to a limited
number of dimensions according to a strategy that is easily verbalizable (Bruner et al., 1956).
This is also the case for many contemporary theories (e.g., Ashby et al., 2011; Johansen and
Palmeri, 2002; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Paul and Ashby, 2013). For instance in the COVIS
model (Ashby et al., 2011; Paul and Ashby, 2013), unidimensional rule-based strategies can
be learned through a hypothesis-testing strategy wherein participants develop simple, ver-
balizable hypotheses for attentional weighting schemes, and then test them through trial and
error. Conjunctive rules can be constructed by combining unidimensional weights through
verbalizable Boolean logic. For instance, to categorize the stimuli shown in Figure 1.2.A,
participants might begin by testing unidimensional strategies (e.g, by placing attentional
weights on only the orientation dimension), but then through trial and error, learn to use
the optimal rule: “when the orientation is less than X and the frequency is greater than Y,
choose category A; otherwise, choose B.”
1.1.1. Dissociable Categorization Systems. Whereas single-system approaches em-
phasize the flexibility and parsimony of Equation 2 to account for a variety of psychological
phenomena, recent research suggests that di↵erent categorization strategies may place disso-
ciable demands on neural systems (Ashby and Maddox, 2005, 2011; Maddox et al., 2004b,a;
Maddox and Ashby, 2004). Rule based categorization tasks are thought to rely on working
memory to maintain the candidate hypotheses, and to recruit neural regions associated with
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Figure 1.2. Rule-Based and Information-Information Categorization Tasks:
Examples of bivariate distributions for stimuli that vary on two dimensions:
frequency and orientation (e.g., the sine-wave gratings illustrated in Figure
1.1.B). A) A conjunctive rule-based categorization task. Rule-based catego-
rization tasks are thought to rely on explicit hypothesis testing strategies.
B) An example of an information-integration categorization task, which are
thought to recruit the procedural learning system.
working memory storage (e.g., DLPFC) and with rule-selection (e.g., anterior cingulate and
caudate head). The salience of a specific rule depends on its past success; on each trial, the
salience of a particular rule is increased if its application allows the observer to transition to
a desirable state, and its salience is decreased if its application results in a transition to an
undesirable state. Switching between rules is thought to be mediated by an attentional shift
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from the active rule to another via a corticostriatal loop involving the anterior cingulate and
head of the caudate nucleus (Ashby and Maddox, 2005; Ashby et al., 1998; Helie et al., 2010).
Information-integration tasks (Figure 1.2.B), however, are thought to rely on the procedural
learning system. These tasks typically require participants to integrate information from
multiple incommensurable stimulus dimensions. They typically require more time to learn
than rule-based tasks, and, once learned, participants typically have di culty verbalizing
the strategy underlying their behavioral performance (Maddox et al., 2003, 2008, 2010).
Posterior regions of the striatum (particularly the tail of the caudate and posterior puta-
men, which are reciprocally connected with high-level visual and motor areas) are thought
to play an important role in information-integration category learning (Cantwell et al., 2015;
Waldschmidt and Ashby, 2011).
An attractive feature of the COVIS model is that it provides a biologically-plausible
framework underlying the key computation outlined in Equation 2: that of integrating in-
formation across multiple stimulus dimensions according to their estimated reliability. Like
many other models of the procedural learning system, it posits that the the key site of
reward-mediated learning is the corticostriatal synapse. Specifically, it posits that the learn-
ing of category structure is mediated by the visual corticostriatal loop (and specifically the
corticostriatal synapses linking visual cortical regions to the body and tail of the caudate).
Formally, COVIS posits that striatal units, S, integrate information from a set of perceptual
units, K, each of which is maximally sensitive to a particular stimulus. The activation of a
particular striatal unit, Sj, on trial n is determined by the activity of these inputs, IK , and
by the strength of the corticostriatal synapses wKj connecting them. This is a compelling
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idea, as each medium spiny projection neuron of the striatum is known to receive converg-
ing glutamatergic input from nearly 20,000 cortical axons (Kincaid et al., 1998; Zheng and
Wilson, 2002), and are thus anatomically well-situated to integrate and classify patterns of
cortical input. For simplicity, COVIS reduces the number of perceptual neurons projecting
to each striatal unit to 625, each of which is maximally sensitive to a particular stimulus in






The synaptic weights, wkj, are updated after each trial according to the phasic dopaminer-
gic reward prediction error signal (Schultz et al., 1997), which is proportional to the di↵erence
between expected and observed rewards:
(4) RewardPredictionError = ObservedReward  PredictedReward
Thus positive reward prediction errors, which occur when reward is greater than expected,
strengthen the synaptic weights, w, at synapses characterized by pre and post-synaptic exci-
tation, while negative prediction errors, which occur when reward is smaller than expected,
have the opposite e↵ect. Thus, COVIS provides a framework where, through trial and error,
the procedural learning system incrementally learns to parcellate multidimensional percep-
tual space into regions associated with specific behavioral or cognitive responses. It does
so by strengthening the synaptic connections that have lead to unexpected reward, and by
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weakening synaptic connections that lead to unexpected loss (or lack of reward). Recent
works supports the assertion that dimensional weights can be learned without reference to a
specialized representation learning system (i.e., model-based processes), and can be learned
directly through this hypothesized corticostriatal mechanism (Niv et al., 2015).
The distinction between rule-based and information-integration categorization strate-
gies mirrors the more widely-known distinction between goal-directed (or model-based) and
habitual (or model-free) strategies underlying performance in instrumental conditioning
paradigms. In goal-directed learning, animals use knowledge about the contingencies be-
tween actions and outcomes to select appropriate behaviors (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Dick-
inson, 1985). Goal-directed behaviors can be formalized using model-based reinforcement
learning algorithms that potentially implement forward (or “tree”) searching (Gläscher et al.,
2010) or mental-simulation, (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007) to maximize rewards and mini-
mize punishments. Functional neuroimaging studies have found caudate activity consistent
with these model-based computations (Gläscher et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012). Ha-
bitual behavior, however, is elicited without consideration of outcome or reward expectancy,
based on stimuli in the environment (Gläscher et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012). Accord-
ingly, dissociations between systems are often assessed via reward devaluation (e.g., lever
pressing is considered habitual when a rat will continue to press the lever for food even after
it has become satiated). Other researchers have suggested that habitual behavior should
be resistant to interference from a simultaneously performed dual task (Ashby et al., 2010),
or require extensive training (Mishkin et al., 1984; Waldschmidt and Ashby, 2011). Func-
tional neuroimaging studies have found sensorimotor putamen activity consistent with these
model-free computations (Miyachi et al., 2002).
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1.1.2. The Weather Prediction Categorization Task. A popular paradigm for
investigating how participants integrate probabilistic information across di↵erent information
sources is the weather prediction categorization task (Knowlton et al., 1994, 1996), which
requires participants to make predictions (e.g., “rain” vs. “sun”) based on the information
provided by multiple partially-informative cues (Figure 1.3). Early work by Knowlton and
colleagues (Knowlton et al., 1994, 1996) suggested that, relative to healthy controls, amnesic
patients were unimpaired during the early stages of learning, but showed impairments later
in training (despite impaired declarative memory for the training session). Patients with
Parkinson’s disease, however, were unable to learn the task (despite intact declarative mem-
ory for the training session). Researchers at the time interpreted these results as evidence
that probabilistic categorization may not rely on declarative knowledge, but may instead
rely on the procedural learning system.
Figure 1.3. The Weather Prediction Task. A) Each of four cards provides a
di↵erent amount of probabilistic evidence towards either a “sun” or a “rain”
response. B) On each trial, participants are shown a set of cards, and are
asked to make a prediction about the correct response. Although a range
of suboptimal strategies are possible (see: Gluck et al., 2002; Meeter et al.,
2008), accurate categorization generally requires integration of probabilistic
information across cues. (Image from Shohamy et al., 2004)
Subsequent research, however, has suggested that the story is more complicated. For
instance, task-knowledge tends to at least be partially declarative (Lagdano et al., 2006;
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Meeter et al., 2006). In support of this conjecture, Poldrack et al. (2001) noted that the
anterior hippocampus, a region that has commonly been associated with declarative memory,
was recruited during the early stages of training. However, they also noted that the task
recruited regions of the basal ganglia, which tended to negatively covary with hippocampal
activity. Thus, one possibility is that the task recruits both declarative and procedural
components; the anterior hippocampus may be required to set up the initial representations
that may then be utilized by other memory systems (Meeter et al., 2008).
1.2. Decision Thresholding
Real-world decisions require decision-makers to not only deliberate about the best pos-
sible choice, but to adjust the temporal dynamics of this process to minimize costs and
maximize gains. In this section, the well-known sequential sampling class of decision-
making model (SSM) is reviewed. Then, the attractor-network class of model is discussed.
This model class instantiates the algorithmic processes outlined in the SSM class within a
biologically-plausible framework. Both model classes provide useful frameworks for consid-
ering the temporal dynamics of decision-making, and for considering how we flexibly adjust
decision thresholds to maximize transient opportunities to transition to desirable states.
1.2.1. Sequential Sampling Models. Sequential sampling models have been par-
ticularly successful in accounting for the temporal dynamics of decision-making behavior.
Although they di↵er in terms of how information is accumulated, they typically posit that
information is accumulated from some baseline level, until a decision threshold is crossed. In
the Drift Di↵usion model (DDM; Figure 1.4; Palmer et al., 2005; Ratcli↵, 1978; Smith and
Ratcli↵, 2004) the strength of decision evidence modulates the speed with which a single
decision variable (representing accumulated evidence) di↵uses towards a decision boundary,
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and the speed with which decision-makers commit to a decision is modulated both by the
strength of this evidence, and the distance between the starting point of the accumulation
process and a decision threshold. In race models, two separate accumulators “race” to a
threshold. Race models have the advantage that they can account for multiple (> 2) re-
sponse options and can more closely mirror known biological principles (i.e., many regions
of the brain are known to accumulate information for specific choices; see Gold and Shadlen,
2007, for review).
Figure 1.4. The Drift Di↵usion Model. In this example, participants make
decisions about whether a stimulus is a “word” or a “non-word.” The DDM
decomposes the decision process into drift rate (the speed with which informa-
tion is integrated), boundary separation (i.e. decisional “caution”), the starting
point of the accumulation process (which can account for decisional bias) and
non-decisional time (e.g., stimulus encoding and response execution). (Image
from van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012)
One reason the SSM framework is attractive is that it provides a compelling characteri-
zation of neural activity observed in many regions of the brain. One particularly influential
body of research examined perceptual decision making in the domain of motion direction
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judgments. In the random dot motion task (RDM; Figure 1.1.A), participants must judge
the direction of motion of a field of dots, and the di culty of the task is manipulated by
varying the percent of dots moving in a coherent direction. A well-known finding is that
error rates and reaction times are negatively correlated with motion coherence. Interestingly,
activity in many regions is well characterized by this accumulate-to-bound framework. For
instance, the activity of neurons in the primate lateral intraparietal area (LIP) is known to
track evidence for specific behavioral responses. It also tends to show a stereotyped pattern
at the time of behavioral response. These findings suggest that these neurons may represent
an important component in a biological framework where evidence is accumulated until a
decision threshold is crossed (for review, see: Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Specifically, in the
random to motion task, these “accumulator” LIP neurons seems to integrate information
across multiple motion-sensitive neuronal pools in the middle temporal area (area MT).
Each of these sensory pools is tuned to a particular motion direction (Britten et al., 1992),
and in binary decisions, the activity of LIP accumulator neurons is well characterized as
the unsigned di↵erence between opposing MT neural populations (Roitman and Shadlen,
2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996). More recent studies have shown that LIP neural activ-
ity reflects learned categorical structure (Fitzgerald et al., 2011; Freedman and Assad, 2006;
Swaminathan and Freedman, 2012), and human studies have found that accumulator-related
activity is not limited to the human homologue of LIP (the intraparietal sulcus) but exists in
a variety of cortical regions including adjoining parietal regions (inferior parietal cortex), pre
and primary motor cortices, insula, and lateral frontal regions (Bernier et al., 2012; Gluth
et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2009; Kayser et al., 2010b; Ploran et al., 2007, 2011).
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Interestingly, regions which track categorical evidence appear to depend on specific task
demands. For instance, when the mapping between category and response is known during
deliberation, regions associated with motor-preparation (e.g., premotor and primary motor
cortices, LIP/IPS) tend to track categorical evidence (Gluth et al., 2012; Thura et al., 2012;
Thura and Cisek, 2014). However, these regions appear to shift based on manipulations
of e↵ector modality (Tosoni et al., 2008), while other regions (e.g., anterior insula) tend to
accumulate information regardless of specific e↵ector modalities (Ho et al., 2009).
SSM models have also allowed researchers to overcome the temporal limitations of fMRI
to investigate distinct components of the decision-making process. For instance, Kayser et al.
(2010a) used an accumulator model (Palmer et al., 2005) to investigate whether any regions
of the brain might covary with the speed with which perceptual information accumulates in
a random dot motion task (see Figure 1.1.A). Their results confirmed that the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS; the homologue of the primate LIP), like the LIP, is sensitive to the rate at
which information accumulates during motion judgments. Interestingly, they additionally
found that the strength of functional connectivity (beta-series correlation; Rissman et al.,
2004) between MT (a regions strongly associated with motion perception) and the IPS neg-
atively covaried with the normative strength of perceptual evidence (i.e., motion coherence).
Conversely, the connectivity between area MT and a more inferior region of the posterior
parietal cortex positively covaried with motion strength. This finding suggests that both
regions of the parietal lobe are sensitive to decisional evidence, but may play opposing roles
during deliberation.
Similarly, Forstmann et al. (2008) used fMRI in conjunction with a race model (the linear
ballistic accumulator; Brown and Heathcote, 2008) to estimate trial-by-trial adjustments of
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response caution. Interestingly, they found that the activity of the striatum and the pre-
SMA negatively covaried with estimates of decisional caution. Using a similar experimental
paradigm and modeling approach, Forstmann and colleagues (2010) found that individual
di↵erences in the strength of anatomical connectivity between the striatum and the pre-SMA
predicted individual di↵erences in the capacity to flexibly-adjust the decision threshold to
match environmental incentives for speed vs. accuracy.
1.2.2. Cortical Attractor Dynamics. Although the SSM framework successfully
models choice behavior and provides a compelling account of the computations involved in
decision making, it provides an incomplete account of the underlying biological mechanisms.
Many of the attractive qualities of the SSM framework, however, have been successfully
instantiated (for formal comparison, see: Bogacz et al., 2006) in biophysically-based mod-
els that characterize the decision process according to the attractor dynamics of competi-
tive category-selective neuronal pools (e.g., Deco and Rolls, 2006; Furman and Wang, 2008;
Standage et al., 2011; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wong and Wang, 2006). Within this
framework, slow recurrent excitatory connections within neuronal pools support the integra-
tion of transient sensory information over time, and mutual inhibition between pools assures
categorical selectivity (i.e., “winner take all” dynamics; for reviews, see: Deco et al., 2012;
Wang, 2008).
The duration of information representation within each category-selective pool emerges
naturally from the balance between recurrent excitation within pools and mutual inhibition
between pools (Figure 1.5). When inactive, recurrent excitatory e↵ects are weak, and the
network is characterized by spontaneous activity. When excitatory and inhibitory e↵ects
are appropriately balanced, the network can integrate information over time (and can do
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Figure 1.5. Attractor Dynamics. A) A schematic of a 2-variable attrac-
tor network (Wong and Wang, 2006), in which two populations of category-
selective neuronal pools (D1 and D2) receive excitatory sensory innervation
from di↵erent information sources (I1 and I2). The dynamics of the system are
influenced by recurrent excitation (W+), inhibition between pools, and by the
sensory inputs. B) The network dynamics can be characterized as an energy
landscape where a the motion of a particle across the landscape characterizes
the deliberative process. D1 and D2 compete through inhibitory connections
until one wins, at which point the system falls into a basin of attraction. When
excitatory and inhibitory influences are balanced, the network can integrate
information over time. (A) adapted from Wong and Wang, 2006; B) adapted
from Standage et al. 2011).
so optimally, given constraints; Bogacz et al., 2006; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012). When
recurrent excitation is su ciently strong, the network falls into a basin of attraction, and
the decision process tends towards commitment; new information is not integrated, but
information related to the choice can be stored until a response is required (Cisek et al.,
2009; Standage et al., 2011, 2013). Gain modulation of this recurrent excitation, therefore,
is a simple biological mechanism that may underlie flexible adjustments of the speed-accuracy
trade-o↵, and one that is common to several models that account for the e↵ect (Furman and
16
Wang, 2008; Standage et al., 2011, 2013). In support of this framework, several groups
have observed, within regions associated with the integration of categorical evidence, e↵ects
associated with a monotonically-increasing “urgency” signal, representing a growing pressure
to produce a behavioral response within each trial (Churchland et al., 2008; Thura and Cisek,
2014; Thura et al., 2014).
While several groups have modeled the e↵ect of urgency on decisional evidence as a
multiplicative interaction between urgency and decision evidence (where urgency modulates
the slope of activity in category-selective pools; Cisek et al., 2009; Ditterich, 2006; Thura
et al., 2012), others have modeled it as an additive e↵ect (where urgency increases baseline
activity across all category-selective neuronal pools; Churchland et al., 2008; Gluth et al.,
2012; Hanks et al., 2014). It is unclear whether the distinction between these functions is
theoretically meaningful at the algorithmic level; both mechanisms may drive the system to-
wards commitment. However, the distinction implies underlying mechanistic di↵erences; an
additive signal increases activity across all category-selective pools, while the multiplicative
signal implies competitive inhibitory influences between pools.
1.2.3. The Role of the Basal Ganglia. Gain modulation within cortical accu-
mulator circuits is likely only one component within a system underlying our capacity to
flexibly adjust decision strategy; modulation of the cortico-basal ganglia circuit likely plays
an important role as well (for review, see: Bogacz et al., 2010). Several features of the basal
ganglia make it an attractive candidate for playing an important role in action selection and
decision-making. First, its nuclei are somatotopically organized, such that di↵erent regions
are associated with di↵erent body parts, and are subdivided such that di↵erent channels can
represent di↵erent movements (Alexander et al., 1986). Second, the basal ganglia are known
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to disinhibit salient cortical representations (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990), and have been
associated with the selection of both motor responses (Redgrave et al., 1999; Mink, 1996)
and higher level representations (McNab and Klingberg, 2008).
There are three primary pathways through which the basal ganglia interacts with cerebral
cortex. These pathways exert their e↵ects though opposing influences on thalamic excitation.
The first two pathways to be identified were the direct and indirect pathways (Albin et al.,
1989; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990). The GABAergic medium spiny projection neurons
(MSN's) in the direct pathway (also sometimes referred to as the “Go” pathway) inhibit
activity in the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi), attenuating its tonic inhibitory
influence on the thalamus, and ultimately lowering the threshold required for the thalamus to
become excited in response to other inputs (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990). The MSNs in the
indirect pathway (also sometimes referred to as the “NoGo” pathway) inhibit activity in the
external segment of the globus pallidus (GPe), thereby attenuating its tonic inhibitory e↵ect
on the GPi. The GPis tonic inhibitory influence on the thalamus is thereby increased, raising
the threshold required to elicit thalamic activity. The direct and indirect pathways influence
the threshold required for thalamic activity, but thalamic excitation seems to be driven
primarily via direct projections from other regions. The medial dorsal thalamic nucleus,
for instance, is primarily innervated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and the ventral lateral
nucleus is primarily innervated by premotor regions (Haber and Calzavara, 2009). It should
be noted that some thalamocortical cells, however, show post-inhibitory rebound bursting
(Ulrich and Huguenard, 1997), suggesting that the basal ganglia output nuclei may have at
least some direct excitatory influence on thalamic cells.
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A third pathway, the hyperdirect pathway (Nambu et al., 2000), projects to the subthala-
mic nucleus (STN) and then to the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi), bypassing
the striatum. This pathway is glutamatergic rather than GABAergic, and so cortically-driven
excitation of the STN excites the GPi, ultimately inhibiting the thalamus. Projections from
the STN to the thalamus are di↵use, and a great deal of research (e.g., Aron and Poldrack,
2006; Frank, 2006; Mink, 1996) suggests that while the direct and indirect pathways are
responsible for thresholding specific input/output associations, excitation of the hyperdirect
pathway instead raises the global thalamic excitation threshold such that stronger cortical
innervation is required to produce any thalamic output. This global inhibition would likely
be useful in situations in which it is desirable to withhold fast responding in order to im-
prove accuracy. Excitation of the striatum may thus serve to lower decision thresholds by
decreasing the tonic inhibitory influence of the basal ganglia output nuclei on specific salient
cortical representations (Simen et al., 2006; Chevalier and Deniau, 1990), and excitation of
the STN may conversely serve to increase global inhibitory e↵ects (Ratcli↵ and Frank, 2012;
Wiecki and Frank, 2013).
1.3. Confidence and Uncertainty
Even in the controlled experimental context provided by the random dot motion task
(Figure 1.1.A), the decision maker must correctly make inferences across many forms of
uncertainty. For instance, a decision maker must correctly filter out the noise associated
with the visual stimulus, uncertainty about the appropriate response, and uncertainty about
the consequences of the final choice. Our understanding of the brain suggests that, in many
ways, it mirrors this functional hierarchy. For instance, neurons in area MT are known to
be sensitive to the proportion of dots moving in a coherent direction (Britten et al., 1992),
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neurons in the, parietal lobe (Newsome et al., 1989) and frontal eye fields (FEF) (Gold and
Shadlen, 2000) are thought to integrate the uncertainty expressed across MT pools in the
service of selecting an appropriate response (see Gold and Shadlen, 2007, for review), and
neurons in the OFC may integrate uncertainty across neuronal pools to form an estimate
concerning the probability that the selected option will be correct (Rolls et al., 2010b,a).
Neural computations are well-approximated by the rules of probabilistic inference, where
the brain represents information in the form of probability distributions (Doya et al., 2007;
Knill and Pouget, 2004; Pouget et al., 2013). Within this framework, the assignment of
degrees of confidence to beliefs, whether they be beliefs about the causes of sensory input
(e.g., MT), the consequences of actions (e.g., LIP and FEF), or the probability of reaching a
desirable state (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)), is a fundamental computational principle.
In the present paper, however, “confidence” is reserved for decisional confidence, the choice-
independent probability of reaching a desirable state (rather than perceptual confidence
or categorical confidence). This matches its current use in the literature (Gherman and
Philiastides, 2014; Hebart et al., 2014; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Rolls et al., 2010b,a).
Decisional confidence is thought to support several important functions. First, it moti-
vates information seeking (Daw et al., 2006; Friston et al., 2012), such that uncertainty (the
inverse of confidence) tends to be negatively correlated with the value of obtaining additional
information. Second, in complex environments, it allows decision-makers to prepare for the
consequences of their choices; this is particularly important in environments when sequences
of actions must be chained without feedback. Thirdly, as confidence represents the degree of
belief associated with reaching a desirable state, it plays an important role in the calculation
of reward prediction error (eq. 4).
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In the present paper, confidence was calculated from normative characteristics of the ex-
perimental design and from idiosyncratic patterns of participant behavior. This di↵ers from
the way confidence is typically operationalized in the metacognitive literature, where a goal
is to dissociate subjective confidence from normative confidence. Thus, in the metacognitive
literature, confidence is typically assessed through measures that are distinct from behav-
ioral accuracy. For instance, in post-decision wagering tasks (Persaud et al., 2007; Seth,
2008), decision-makers are asked to indicate how much they would be willing to wager that
were correct after making a choice. In “uncertain option” tasks (Hampton, 2001), decision-
makers are given a low-valued, but certain option that can be an advantageous choice under
conditions of low confidence. In “delayed incentives” tasks (Kepecs et al., 2008), decision
makers make a choice, but must then wait before receiving a reward (the amount of time
that they are willing to wait is assumed to be positively correlated with confidence). Thus,
an important question in the domain of metacognitive research is how various biases mediate
di↵erences between subjective estimates of decisional confidence (i.e., subjective estimates
of decisional accuracy or “type 2” sensitivity) and actual decisional accuracy (i.e., “type 1”
sensitivity; Clarke et al., 1959; Fleming and Lau, 2014; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012).
Although this is an important question, before investigating the neural substrates un-
derlying fine-grained di↵erences between subjective and objective estimates of confidence, it
is important to understand how objective confidence is represented in the brain. Following
previous work (Gherman and Philiastides, 2014; Hebart et al., 2014; Rolls et al., 2010b,a),
the current study used a model-based approach to identify latent representations of norma-
tive confidence in the absence of explicit behavioral measures. The approach is similar to
Bayesian decision theory and signal detection theory, where a normatively optimal decision
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variable, D (an estimate of the evidence for a particular choice), for option, A, given a
stimulus, s, can be calculated as the log likelihood ratio:
(5) D(s) = log
P (s|A)
P (s|B)
where P (s|B) = 1  P (s|A).
Within this framework, an optimal choice would be to choose option A when D(s) is
greater than 0, and an estimate of confidence emerges as the unsigned decision variable:
|D(s)|. Confidence thus represents the strength of decision evidence, without regard to a
particular choice. negat di↵erent groups have used similar approaches to model confidence.
Vickers and Packer (1982), for instance, suggested that, within a race model framework, con-
fidence could be estimated as the unsigned di↵erence between the winning and losing races
(which they termed the “balance of evidence”). Rolls et al. (2010; 2010a; 2010b) found that
regions of the human medial prefrontal cortex and cingulate cortex covaried with confidence
and hypothesized that this representation might emerge from the unsigned di↵erence in ac-
tivity between category-selective attractor networks. In task requiring discriminations of
faces vs. houses, Philiastides et al. (2010) found that activity in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) covaried both with the unsigned di↵erence in evidence between categories,
and with the unsigned di↵erence in activity between regions associated with perceptual evi-
dence for the choice options “face” (posterior fusiform gyrus) vs. “house” (parahippacampal
gyrus). Similarly, using direct cellular measures in behaving rats, Kepecs et al. (2008) found
that that neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex were sensitive to the distance from an arbitrary
category boundary in an odor classification task, and that this representation predicted the
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amount of time that rats were willing to wait for reward. Additionally, using the random
dot motion task with non-human primates, Ding and Gold (2010) found that distinct neural
populations in the primate caudate nucleus tracked confidence and categorical evidence.
As decisional confidence negatively covaries with the value of seeking additional infor-
mation, we would expect that decisional uncertainty would slow response times. In fact,
it is well-known that response times negatively covary with decision di culty (Vickers and
Packer, 1982). Thus, as both confidence and urgency are thought to influence the dynamics
of the deliberative process (shifting the system toward decisional commitment; Figure 1.5),
we might expect to e↵ects of these functions in overlapping regions of the brain. Addition-
ally, we might expect that urgency multiplicatively modulates the slope of the confidence
function if, as Rolls et al. have suggested (2010a; 2010b), confidence is calculated based on
the di↵erence in activity between category selective neuronal pools, and if, as experimental
and computational work suggests, activity in these regions is (multiplicatively) modulated
by urgency (Churchland et al., 2008; Cisek et al., 2009; Ditterich, 2006; Gluth et al., 2012;
Hanks et al., 2014; Thura et al., 2012).
1.4. Overview of the Current Experiment
Many previous studies have used perceptual decision making tasks in conjunction with
direct cellular recordings to track neural representations associated with decisional evidence.
While these studies have provided important insights into how we integrate information
over time, perceptual decision-making tasks are generally poorly suited to dissociate rep-
resentations associated with evidence accumulation from those associated with decisional
confidence and urgency; in these tasks, each of these functions increases monotonically with
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time. To disentangle their neural representations, researchers must therefore employ exper-
imental paradigms in which the strength of evidence for and against particular categories is
modulated within single trials.
The present experiment uses a temporally-extended version of the weather-prediction cat-
egorization task (Knowlton et al., 1994, 1996) in which the features of an abstract “amoeba”
stimulus were added to the display one-by-one over four discrete steps (Figure 3.1). Each
feature was associated with a di↵erent amount of probabilistic evidence for a response with
fingers of the left vs. right hands, and participants had to integrate this information across
time and across distinct stimulus features (cf., Wheeler et al., 2014; Yang and Shadlen, 2007).
This allowed the use of a model-based approach, wherein both the normative probabilistic
characteristics of the experimental design, and measures based on participant behavior, were
used to track the dynamical evolution of categorical evidence and confidence as participants
deliberated about impending choices.
Categorical evidence was defined as the cumulative log likelihood ratio (CmLogLR) that
a particular categorical response would lead to reward. Decisional confidence was modeled
as the unsigned di↵erence in evidence for each of the two categories (De Martino et al.,
2013; Hebart et al., 2014; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012). Finally, urgency was modeled as a
monotonically-increasing signal, which peaked at the last opportunity to earn reward (i.e.,
the onset of the fourth stimulus feature). In addition to tracking the independent evolution
of urgency, the present research also investigated the possibility that urgency modulates
the slopes of the neural representations of categorical evidence and confidence. In line with
previous research, it was hypothesized that the integration of categorical evidence would
recruit regions of the parietal lobe (Ploran et al., 2007, 2011), as well as primary and premotor
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regions (Gluth et al., 2012; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011; Thura and Cisek, 2014; Wheeler
et al., 2014). It was predicted that frontal regions, such as the VMPFC, as well as the OFC
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex would represent e↵ector-independent decisional confidence
(Cohen et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2013; Heekeren et al., 2006; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011;
Rolls et al., 2010a,b). It was also predicted that urgency would be represented in regions
associated with modulation of the SAT (e.g., DLPFC, pre-SMA and striatum; Forstmann
et al., 2008, 2010; van Veen et al., 2008). Urgency may additionally modulate representations
of categorical evidence, either increasing activity across all neuronal pools (Cisek et al., 2009;
Ditterich, 2006), or by modulating the slope of decisional evidence (Churchland et al., 2008;
Gluth et al., 2012; Hanks et al., 2014). To investigate the neural substrates associated with
these signals, an approach was adopted which allowed the investigation of the additive and
multiplicative e↵ects separately and in conjunction.
1.5. Overview of Remaining Sections
The remaining sections of the paper describe the pilot study and the primary study. The
pilot utilized a similar experimental paradigm to estimate the number of participants needed
to achieve su cient statistical power. Additionally, based on the results from the pilot,
temporal jitter was added to the final experimental paradigm, and the log-likelihood ratios
were slightly modified to improve behavioral performance. After describing the behavioral





The pilot experiment employed a temporally-extended categorization task in which seven
di↵erent stimuli accumulated on the screen, each of which was associated with a di↵erent
amount of probabilistic evidence for a response with the right or left hands. The design
was similar to that used in the final experiment, however, participants were required to
integrate probabilistic information across di↵erent stimuli, rather than across the features of
a single stimulus (Figure 2.3 vs. Figure 3.1). Additionally, the inter-feature intervals were
not jittered, and thus the model-based approach adopted in the final study was not used.
Rather, in order to provide useful estimates of the number of participants required for the
final study, the cumulative categorical evidence available on the last step was used for power
analyses.
2.0.1. Participants. Three participants were recruited from the CSU community. All
participants were healthy, right handed adults (2 female) with an average age of 24 (range
22-30). Participants were screened for history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, for
current use of psychoactive medications, and for exclusionary MRI criteria. Based on low
behavioral accuracy, one participant's data was excluded from the final analyses.
2.0.2. Stimuli. Stimuli were abstract shapes, each of which was associated with a dif-
ferent weight of probabilistic evidence towards responses with fingers of the left and right
hands (the “d” and “k” keyboard locations, respectively). The logLR's assigned to the in-
dividual stimuli were 1.12, -1.12, .71, -.71, .32, -.32 and 0 (where positive weights arbitrarily
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indicate evidence for a left response). To mitigate confounds associated with visual salience,
the mapping between logLR and visual stimulus was randomized for each participant.
2.1. Training
At least a day in advance of scanning, participants trained on the individual stimuli in
three blocks. On each trial, a single stimulus was presented in the center of the screen,
and participants made a guess about whether it belonged in category “A” or category “B”
(Figure 2.1). Feedback was disbursed according to Equation 7, and participants learned
through trial and error. In the first block they trained on the stimuli with logLR equal to
-1.12, 1.12, -.32 and .32. In the second block, they trained on the stimuli with logLR equal
to -.71, .71 and 0. In the third block, they trained on all the stimuli at once. For each block,
stimuli were presented in random order, and participants trained until they reach an 80%
accuracy criterion. The criterion was polled every 150 trials, and was reset if participants
were unsuccessful in reaching it.
Figure 2.1. Training Task. On each trial, participants saw an abstract stim-
ulus presented in the center of the computer screen. They made a guess about
it's category membership, and then were given corrective feedback. Positive
feedback consisted of a green checkmark and a pleasant tone, while negative
feedback consisted of a red “X” and an unpleasant tone.
2.1.1. Post Decisional Wagering. To allow estimation of the subjective weights of
evidence that each participant placed on the individual stimuli, after training, participants
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performed a post-decision wagering task (Persaud et al., 2007; Seth, 2008). In this task,
participants categorized a stimulus, and then indicated how much they would be willing
to bet that they were correct (Figure 2.2). Feedback was similar to the training task,
however, participants also received information about the (hypothetical) money won or lost
on each trial. Stimuli were presented in random order, and participants rated each exemplar
three times. After performing the post-decisional wagering task, participants practiced the
temporally-extended task that they would later perform in the scanner by completing one
block of 120 trials.
Figure 2.2. Post Decisional Wagering Task. On each trial, participants saw
a stimulus, made a categorization decision, and then were asked to indicate
how much they would like to bet that they were correct (options were $2.50,
$5, $7.50 or $10). They were then given feedback as in the training task (figure
2.1), and were also told how much (hypothetical) money they had won or lost.
2.2. Scanning
2.2.1. Task. In the scanner, participants performed a temporally-extended version of the
task wherein the stimuli accumulated on the screen in random (non-overlapping) locations,
one-by-one, over seven discrete steps (Figure 2.3). Stimulus onsets coincided with the TR
and were not jittered (for discussion of jitter, see section 3.2.2). Participants were free to
respond at any time during the trial, and so the number of trials per session varied based on
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behavioral performance. The optimal response for each trial was determined by the sign of
the sum of the logLRs associated with the individual stimuli:







where S1:7 indicate the specific stimuli included in a particular trial, and w, the logLR as-
signed to each stimulus. Feedback was disbursed according to the corresponding probability:









where P (Right) = 1 - P (Left).
Through behavioral piloting, a points system was developed to balance demands for
speed and accuracy. For each step of “revelation” (Ploran et al., 2007), the points available
reduced by 2 points (22 points were available to win on the first step, while only 10 were
available on the last step). To discourage participants from using strategies based on guess-
ing, participants lost double the number of points they would have won if they were correct.
The points were adjusted to maximize variability in response timing.
2.2.2. Image Acquisition. Data were acquired using a 3-tesla Siemens Magnetom Trio-
Tim scanner. Stimuli were presented using the psychtoolbox for MATLAB (Brainard, 1997).
Functional volumes were acquired in three sessions. Each session involved the acquisition of
560 whole brain volumes with an interleaved 2-dimensionsal echo planar imaging (EPI) se-
quence (28 slices, TR = 1,500 ms, TE = 25 ms. Flip angle=75 degrees). The first 4 volumes
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Figure 2.3. Scanner Task. In the scanner, participants performed a
temporally-extended paradigm in which the stimuli accumulated one-by-one,
until a maximum of seven stimuli were on the screen. Participants were free to
respond at any time. The opportunity to earn a decreasing number of points
on each step provided incentive for participants to respond earlier in the trial.
were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration e↵ects. Anatomical images were collected using
an magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence.
2.3. Analyses
2.3.1. Preprocessing. Preprocessing involved slice-timing correction to the tenth slice,
motion correction, coregistration, segmentation of the anatomical images, and normalization
of the structural and functional images to the Montreal Neuroligical Institute (MNI) tem-
plate. Low frequency drifts in the timeseries were removed via a high pass filter with a cuto↵
frequency of 1/ 128 Hz. The normalized images were smoothed with a 6-mm full-width-at-
half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
2.4. Results
2.4.1. Behavior. Average accuracy, determined relative to an optimal observer making
decisions based on the sign of the cumulative logLR available on the last step was 77% correct
(SD = 3.4%). Results from the post-decisional wagering task suggested that participants
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had di culty learning the stimuli with logLR's of -.36 and .36 (Figure 2.2). Accordingly, in
the final experiment, these weights were increased to .56.
Figure 2.4. Post Decisional Wagering Results. The amount of money par-
ticipants were willing to bet reflected the logLR's used to determine the prob-
abilistic disbursement of feedback. Error bars represent the standard error of
the mean.
2.4.2. Power Analyses. The Powermap statistical software developed by Joyce and
colleagues (2012) was used to estimate the number of participants needed in the final study.
This software allows voxelwise estimation of the number of subjects needed to achieve a
specified power level (>= 80%) while correcting for multiple comparisons (False Discovery
Rate q < .05). The method is based on random field theory, which is also used by SPM
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging; the software used for analyses in the final study).
Notably, this analysis indicated that with fewer than 20 participants, it would be possible
to achieve power of 80% for e↵ects related to categorical evidence (for a response with the
right hand) in the left SMA, left postcentral motor region, left caudate and right cerebellum.
Conversely, activity in left cortical motor regions, and right superior parietal lobe exceeded
this criterion for evidence towards a response with the left hand (Table A.1). Based partially
31
on these results and past research (Friston, 2012; Kayser et al., 2010a; Ploran et al., 2011),
20 participants were included in the primary experiment.
As it is known to inflate type 1 error rate, power analyses on the data from the primary
data-set were not performed. For instance, if one were to run a power-analysis based on
the first 2-3 participants of the primary experiment, the number of subjects in the final
experiment becomes a free parameter that depends on the sample data. As standard statistic
tests do not account for this e↵ect, this procedure can inflate the type 1 error rate, and the
magnitude of the e↵ect depends on the proportion of final data included in the power analyses
(Mumford, 2012). Posthoc power analyses were also not performed on data from the primary
experiment, as these are considered to be uninformative (see Goodman and Berline, 1994;





Twenty right-handed participants (mean age = 24, SD = 4; 12 Female) were recruited
from the Colorado State University and University of Colorado at Boulder communities.
Participants were screened for history of psychiatric and neurological disorders, for current
use of psychoactive medications and for exclusionary MR criteria. They were compensated
at a rate of $20 per hour.
3.2. Task
Participants performed a temporally-extended, binary, probabilistic categorization task
(Wheeler et al., 2014; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) wherein they categorized di↵erent “amoeba”
(Figure 3.1) into one of two categories: “A” (indicated with a left hand response) and
“B” (indicated by a right hand response). For mnemonic purposes, throughout the paper,
the categories will be labeled according to the response with which they were associated
(Category “Left” and Category “Right”). The amoeba stimuli consisted of a black outline
upon which seven di↵erent features could appear. Features could be repeated, and could
appear at four di↵erent locations. Presenting the cues as features of an amoeba was chosen
for several regions. First, it was expected that presenting cues as features of single objects
would encourage integration and representation as aspects of a single object. Second, it
provided a suitable cover story for subjects, as biological kinds are often characterized by
features that may occur probabilistically.
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Figure 3.1. A) Trial Format. In the scanner, each trial began with the pre-
sentation of the blank amoeba profile. The features (abstract organelles, nuclei
and flagella, each representing di↵erent amounts of probabilistic evidence to-
wards a right or left response) then accumulated over four steps. Feature
onsets were separated by a jittered interval. Participants were free to respond
at any time during the trial. After a response, positive feedback was disbursed
according to the probability corresponding to the sum of the logLR's associ-
ated with the four individual features (Equation 9). A series of small dots,
presented below each amoeba, indicated the number of steps remaining in the
trial. B) Although the association between visual feature and logLR was ran-
domized for each participant, one possible mapping is illustrated. Positive
logLR's (arbitrarily) represent evidence for a response made with the left hand.
At the beginning of each trial, the black outline, without any features, served as an ad
hoc fixation point, and cued the beginning of each trial. The features then accumulated on
the amoeba, one-by-one, over four discrete steps. Each feature provided di↵erent probabilis-
tic evidence towards a specific response. The logLRs associated with the individual features
were -2.36, -1.12, -.56, 0, .56, 1.12, and 2.36, where positive weights (arbitrarily) indicates
evidence towards Category Left, and where 0 indicates no evidence towards either response.
Participants were free to respond at any time during the trial, and were instructed to simply
wait until they had enough information before doing so. To avoid possible confounds asso-
ciated with visual salience, the mapping between logLR and visual feature was randomized
for each participant. The optimal response for each trial was determined by the sign of the
sum of the logLRs associated with the individual features:
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(8) CmLogLR(step4) = log7
P (Left|F1, F2, F3, F4)





where F (1:4) indicate the specific features of a particular amoeba and w, the weights assigned
to each feature. Feedback was disbursed according to the corresponding probability:









where P (Right) = 1 - P (Left).
3.2.1. Training. Participants performed two training sessions occurring on separate
days. The three goals of the first training session were 1) to teach participants about the
logLRs associated with the individual features, 2) to teach them how to integrate information
across features, and 3) to give them experience with the temporally-extended task that they
would perform in the scanner. To allow participants to quickly gain experience with a large
number of experimental trials, in the first training task, the temporally-extended paradigm
described above was not used, instead all features were presented at the same time. Through
trial and error, participants learned to categorize amoeba with one, two, three, and then all
four features. On each trial, an amoeba and its feature(s) were presented, and participants
made a decision about whether it belonged in the Left or Right categories. Following correct
responses, positive feedback was disbursed according to the probability corresponding to
sum of the four individual logLRs (eq. 8; the word “Correct” was presented in green for .75
seconds, and was accompanied by a pleasant tone). Following incorrect responses (or trials
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in which the probabilistic feedback schedule mandated it), negative feedback was disbursed
(the word “Wrong” was shown for .75 seconds in red, and was accompanied by an unpleasant
tone).
Participants trained until they reached an 80% accuracy criterion twice (accuracy was
determined in relation to an optimal classifier making decisions based on the sign of the
sum of the logLR's associated with the individual features; the criterion was polled every
30 correct trials, and was reset after 35). After completing this initial training task, partic-
ipants then practiced the temporally-extended paradigm that they would later perform in
the scanner (described above). The second training session, which occurred on the same day
as scanning, was identical to the first, but participants began the session by training with
four features that were presented simultaneously. After reaching the 80% accuracy criterion
(twice), they again practiced with the temporally-extended paradigm.
3.2.2. Scanning. In the scanner, the task was similar to the temporally-extended task
included during the training session, but both the inter-feature and inter-trial intervals were
jittered. The interval between each feature (and between the last step and feedback) was
jittered according to a uniform distribution with a minimum of 2 seconds (to mitigate non-
linear e↵ects associated with shorter intervals; cf., Buckner, 1998; Friston et al., 2000), and
a maximum of 4 seconds, in steps of 0.5 seconds (Gluth et al., 2012). The interval between
each trial was jittered according to a positively-skewed geometric distribution ranging from
2-9 seconds.
The idea behind incorporating temporal jitter between events in fMRI is that it allows
characterization of the shape of the hemodynamic response function (HRF) while maximizing
the e ciency of the experimental design. The most popular HRF consists of the sum of two
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gamma functions (Figure 3.2), which models the peak of the BOLD response as occuring
roughly 4-6 seconds after the onset of a stimulus, an “undershoot” occuring roughly 12-16
seconds after stimulus onset, and a return to baseline shortly thereafter (Friston et al., 1999).
Thus, as our inferences about neural activity are mediated by these slow hemodynamics, in
order to recover the shape of the HRF, a researcher might decide to place stimulus onsets
roughly 16 seconds apart (thereby allowing the BOLD response to return to baseline between
successive events). Such a design would be highly ine↵ecient (as it would be characterized
by a low ratio of number of trials to units of time). Perhaps more importantly, such a
design would constrain the kinds of experimental questions researchers would be able to
investigate. A more sophisticated approach, however, involves the use of “fast event” related
designs, where the onsets of trials are placed more closely together. By jittering the onsets
of the stimulus events in time, the researcher can sample di↵erent points of the HRF shape,
and gain a more accurate representation of the true HRF associated with each experimental
condition.
Figure 3.2. The canonical, double gamma, hemodynamic response function (HRF).
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The fast event related approach depends crucially on the superposition principle that un-
derlies all linear systems: that the HRF associated with multiple events is well-approximated
by the sum of the HRF’s associated with individual events. This generally holds when the
intertrial interval is greater than 1 second (Dale and Buckner, 1997; Friston et al., 2000;
Vazquez and Noll, 1998). However, when the interval trial is shorter, the BOLD response
is known to display nonlinear dynamics (Hinrichs et al., 2000; Huettel and McCarthy, 2000;
Wager et al., 2005). Specifically, the amplitude of the BOLD response tends to be attenuated,
relative to the model predictions.
Participants performed 3 scanner sessions, each of which required 14 minutes. As par-
ticipants were free to respond at any time during the trial, the number of trials per session
varied based on participant behavior.
3.2.2.1. Image Acquisition. Data were acquired using a 3-tesla Siemens Magnetom Tri-
oTim scanner with a 32 channel-head coil. Stimuli were presented using the psychtoolbox
for MATLAB (Brainard, 1997). Each session involved the acquisition of 420 whole brain
volumes with an interleaved EPI-2D sequence (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 25 ms, voxel size: 2.3
x 2.3 x 3.5, flip angle = 75, GRAPPA acceleration factor 2). The first three volumes were
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration e↵ects. Anatomical images were collected using an
MP-RAGE sequence.
3.3. Analyses
3.3.1. Preprocessing. Preprocessing involved slice-timing correction, motion correc-
tion, coregistration, segmentation of the anatomical images, and normalization of the struc-
tural and functional images to the MNI template. For the classical analyses, the normalized
images were smoothed with a 6-mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. For the
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Random E↵ects Bayesian Model Selection (RFX-BMS) procedure (described below), the
normalized unsmoothed functional images (down sampled to 3-mm isotropic voxels, to im-
prove computational e ciency) were used to calculate the log-evidence maps for each model
and each participant. The log-evidence maps were smoothed with an 8-mm full-width-at-
half-maximum Gaussian kernel prior to group-level analyses. Preprocessing and classical
(restricted maximum likelihood) data analyses were performed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM8).
3.3.2. Model-Based Analyses.
3.3.2.1. Overview. A model-based approach was used to track the evolution of categorical
evidence and confidence, and to investigate how these representations were modulated by
urgency. As some of these models were correlated, and yielded highly similar statistical maps,
in order to determine which models best accounted for the data, compared their relative fit
using a random-e↵ects Bayesian model selection procedure (RFX-BMS; Rosa et al., 2010;
Stephan et al., 2009). This involves three steps. First, a classical, contrastive approach was
used to identify voxels surviving standard statistical thresholds. Second, maps representing
the log evidence (logP (y|m), the log probability of the data, y, if it were generated by the
model, m) were generated for each model and each participant using a variational Bayesian
approach to integrate over model parameters. Third, a random e↵ects analysis was used
at the group level (Stephan et al., 2009) to calculate the protected exceedance probability
(PXP; Rigoux et al., 2014), the probability that a given model is more frequent than any of
the other models tested, above and beyond chance. Although calculation of the log evidence
maps is computationally intensive, the RFX-BMS approach is attractive, as it provides
an intuitive metric of model fit, allows comparison of non-nested models, and has some
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favorable properties when compared to the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian
Information Criterion (Penny, 2012; Rigoux et al., 2014). For this analyses, the spm BMS
function included in SPM12 was used.
For both the classical and Bayesian analyses, it was assumed that neural activity asso-
ciated with deliberation would continue across each jittered inter-feature interval, and so
each feature step was modeled with a duration equal to the di↵erence between its onset
and the onset of the following feature or the behavioral response. Such variable-duration
epoch models tend to be more sensitive for paradigms involving cognitive events of variable
duration than constant epoch or variable amplitude impulse models (Grinband et al., 2008).
The canonical SPM hemodynamic response function was used for all models. The topo-
logical false discovery rate (Chumbley and Friston, 2009) was used to correct for multiple
comparisons (q ¡ .05, with an initial cluster forming threshold of p ¡ .001).
3.3.2.2. Definition of Parametric Modulators (PMs). As positive feedback was disbursed
based on all evidence available at the end of the trial, it was not possible to accurately calcu-
late cumulative logLR for steps 1-3 by summing the logLRs for these features (as in equation
8). Instead, these values were determined computationally, by tabulating the full (2401 x
4) permutation matrix and calculating the proportion that each partial feature sequence
would be optimally categorized as Left. As evidence for the two categories was perfectly
anticorrelated, confidence was calculated as the unsigned di↵erence in evidence for the two
categories (unsigned CmLogLR; cf., Fetsch et al., 2014; Hebart et al., 2014; Rolls et al.,
2010a). Uncertainty was perfectly anticorrelated with confidence. Urgency was modeled as
a linearly increasing signal that peaked on the fourth step (the last possible step to earn
positive feedback). A linear function was used, as preliminary RFX-BMS analyses provided
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evidence that it provided a better fit than logistic or exponential functions. To model the
multiplicative e↵ect of urgency on categorical evidence and confidence, the mean-centered
evidence PM (CmLogLR or confidence) was multiplied by urgency. The multiplicative e↵ect
of urgency therefore modulated the slope of the evidence variables (categorical evidence and
confidence) such that the di↵erence between high and low values increased with urgency.
To fit the models to the strategies used by individual participants, the subjective weights
of evidence (sWOE) that each participant placed on the individual features were estimated
(Figure 3.3.B). A Bayesian logistic regression analysis (prior mean = 0 for all coe cients;
Gelman et al., 2008) was employed to do so in a manner robust to separation. To calcu-
late the cumulative subjective logLR, a similar procedure was used to calculate cumulative
normative logLR; the full permutation matrix of beta coe cients was tabulated, and then
the proportion that each sequence of features would be optimally categorized as Left was
calculated. Calculation of the other subjective regressors also followed the process outlined
for the construction of the normative regressors.
3.3.2.3. Classical Analyses. Four models (Table 3.1) were used to investigate categorical
evidence and confidence as well as both additive and multiplicative e↵ects of urgency. The
first parametric modulator (PM1) tracked decisional evidence (categorical evidence or confi-
dence) while the second PM (PM2) tracked urgency. As the second PM was orthogonalized
with respect to the first, it represents an additive e↵ect of urgency. The interaction term
included in the first in the second and fourth models represent multiplicative e↵ects of ur-
gency (where urgency modulates the slope of the decisional evidence function). As positive
logLR's (arbitrarily) indicate evidence for a “Left” response, and as evidence for the two cat-
egories was perfectly anticorrelated, the positive contrast revealed regions tracking evidence
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for this response, while the negative contrast revealed regions tracking evidence for category
“Right.” Similarly, as confidence and uncertainty were also perfectly anticorrelated, it was
possible able to track their representations via positive and negative contrasts, respectively.
Table 3.1. Classical Models. “CmLogLR”: Categorical evidence. “Conf.”:
Confidence. “Urg.”: Urgency. PM1: the first parametric modulator. PM2:
the second parametric modulator.
Model Name PM1 PM2 Positive Contrast Negative Contrast
CmLogLR CmLogLR Urg. ”Left” ”Right”
CmLogLR* Urg. CmLogLR* Urg. Urg. ”Left” * Urg. ”Right” * Urg.
Conf. Conf. Urg. Conf. Uncertainty
Conf.* Urg. Conf.* Urg. Urg. Conf.*Urg. Uncertainty*Urg.
The default orthogonalization of regressors in SPM was left on (thus shared variance was
assigned to the first PM while urgency was orthogonalized with respect to it). It was thus
possible to investigate multiplicative e↵ects of urgency via the first PM, and orthogonal,
additive e↵ects via the second. Parametric e↵ects were considered only for correct trials, but
incorrect trials were included in the design matrix as variables of no interest.
3.3.2.4. RFX-BMS. As there was considerable overlap between the statistical maps de-
rived from the classical analyses, three RFX-BMS analyses were conducted. The first com-
pared categorical evidence to categorical evidence (multiplicatively) modulated by urgency.
The second compared confidence to confidence (multiplicatively) modulated by urgency. The
third compared uncertainty to uncertainty (multiplicatively) modulated by urgency. For each
model, one PM per mean regressor was included. Whereas the classical analyses supported
use of a contrastive approach (which di↵erentiates positive and negative correlations with
particular regressors), the RFX-BMS analyses provide information about the ability of each
complete model to account for variance in the BOLD signal. These analyses were limited
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to voxels within a binary mask that included all significant voxels from the corresponding
classical statistical maps (Gluth et al., 2014). This allowed me to compare these models
within a single framework, to use these analyses to inform our interpretations of the classical
statistical maps, and to limit inferences to voxels surpassing standard statistical thresholds.
In Figure 3.11, each PXP map was thresholded to include only voxels where the model pro-
vided the best fit. These thresholded probability maps allow the reader to quickly identify
these voxels, and to make inferences about the strength of evidence relative to the other
models tested.
3.4. Behavioral Results
Average accuracy (determined relative to an optimal classifier making decisions based
on the sign of the cumulative normative logLR on the last step) was 85% correct (SD =
6.34%). Participants were fairly conservative, and showed a strong tendency to wait until
they saw all features before making a behavioral response (average response step = 3.77,
SD = 0.25). A logistic regression analyses (described above) was conducted to confirm that
participants used a strategy wherein they weighted the features according to their reliability
rather than using a simpler strategy (e.g., counting the features belonging to each category,
or considering only the most informative features; cf., Gluck et al., 2002; Meeter et al.,
2006). In Figure 3.3.B, the normalized beta weights for each participant are plotted against
the normalized normative logLR. The linear pattern and close correspondence between the
two sets of estimates provides evidence that participants applied weights closely resembling
the normative logLR used to determine the disbursement of feedback. A second logistic
regression analysis, which was conducted to investigate whether participants placed greater
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weights on particular steps (Figure 3.3.C), found no evidence of such an e↵ect, F (3,76) =
0.48, p = 0.7; Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis = 8.87.
Figure 3.3. Behavioral performance. A) For each participant, the proportion
of Category Left responses is plotted across 10 bins of cumulative normative
LogLR (equation 8). B) Normalized subjective weights of evidence (sWOE)
vs. the normalized normative logLR used to determine the probabilistic dis-
bursement of feedback. X-axis: normalized logLR. Y-axis: normalized sWOE
derived from each participant's pattern of behavioral performance. (Grey dots
represent individual subject estimates, Dark red = mean, light red = 95%
confidence interval, blue = 1 SD). C) Influence of each step on choice. Y-axis:
absolute normalized mean sWOE for each step. These analyses provide evi-
dence that subjects tended to integrate information across features according
to a weighting scheme that closely approximated the normative characteristics
of the probabilistic task environment.
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3.5. Neuroimaging Results
3.5.1. Cumulative Normative LogLR vs. Cumulative Subjective LogLR. To
reduce the number of models investigated, the normative (which was used to defined the
probabilistic disbursement of feedback) and subjective (which was derived from the logistic
regression coe cients) CmLogLR models were compared using the RFX-BMS procedure.
As described above, significant clusters were first identified by considering the positive and
negative contrasts of the CmLogLR regressor over implicit baseline. The supra-threshold
voxels from both maps were then combined into a single mask. Considering only voxels
within this mask, the relative model evidence was then compared using the protected ex-
ceedance probability (PXP) maps derived from the RFX-BMS procedure. Although the
classical analyses yielded similar maps for the normative and subjective models, the model
comparison procedure provided stronger evidence for the subjective model in the majority
of clusters (67%). Based on this weak evidence, the subjective CmLogLR was considered for
all remaining neuroimaging analyses.
3.5.2. Classical Analyses.
3.5.2.1. Mean E↵ect of Features. A contrast of mean features> implicit baseline was used
to investigate regions broadly involved in processing the stimulus features. As the resulting
map yielded widespread activation, in order to provide meaningful interpretation, instead
of correcting for multiple comparisons using the topological false discovery rate (Chumbley
and Friston, 2009), the more conservative family-wise error rate was used. The bilateral
intraparietal sulcus, bilateral insula, middle cingulate, superior and orbitofrontal gyri were
involved in processing the stimulus features (Table A.2; Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4. Mean E↵ect of Features. Regions associated with this contrast
were generally involved in processing the stimulus features. (Contrast: Mean
Features > implicit baseline).
3.5.2.2. Task Negative E↵ects. A contrast of implicit baseline > mean features was used
to investigate regions negatively correlated with feature processing. This analysis revealed
regions known to be involved in the default mode network, including inferior medial frontal
cortex, posterior cingulate, as well as bilateral hippocampus (Table A.3); Figure 3.5).
3.5.2.3. Categorical Evidence (CmLogLR) and its Interaction with Urgency. Categorical
evidence tracked the evidence for responses with the left vs. right hands (and was oper-
ationalized as the cumulative logLR for each response). Evidence for a left response was
represented in a large contralateral region of the right pre- and post-central gyri (overlap-
ping BA4 and BA6) extending into the right superior parietal lobe, and in the subcortical
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Figure 3.5. Task-Negative E↵ects. Regions associated with this contrast
generally showed greater activity during baseline (contrast: implicit baseline
> Mean Features).
activity of left cerebellar lobules IV and V, as well as in the right posterior putamen / globus
pallidus and motor regions of the thalamus (Figure 3.6). Conversely, the regressors tracking
evidence for a right response elicited activity in the left pre and post-central gyri. The model
tracking the multiplicative interaction between categorical evidence and urgency yielded a
highly similar statistical map (Table A.4; Figure 3.6.B).
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Figure 3.6. Cortical (bilateral pre- and post-central and primary motor re-
gions), subcortical (right posterior putamen and posterior putamen) and cere-
bellar (Lobules V and VI) somatomotor regions tracked the evolution of cate-
gorical evidence. Left and Right indicate evidence towards the respective cat-
egories. A) Categorical evidence. B) The model tracking the (multiplicative)
interaction between categorical evidence and urgency. The model tracking cat-
egorical evidence and the model tracking its interaction with urgency yielded
similar statistical maps (contrast: PM > implicit baseline).
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3.5.2.4. Classical Results: Confidence and Uncertainty (Unsigned CmLogLR) and its In-
teraction with Urgency. As evidence for each of the two categories were perfectly anticor-
related, confidence was modeled as unsigned CmLogLR. Whereas categorical evidence rep-
resents evidence for specific categorical responses (i.e., the probability of positive feedback
given a specific action), confidence tracks the probability of positive feedback irrespective
of particular categories. Therefore, whereas categorical evidence can be used to select the
best possible choice, confidence allows the decision maker to determine whether it might
be advantageous to opt-out of certain trials (e.g., if the costs of an incorrect response out-
weigh the potential benefits of guessing), and to learn e ciently from feedback (the unsigned
CmLogLR can also be interpreted as a reward prediction signal).
Confidence (Table A.5; Figure 3.7.A) was represented in the activity of the bilateral
SMA and striatum (bilateral putamen and right caudate body), bilateral temporoparietal
junction, bilateral insula, bilateral middle frontal regions, right middle orbital gyrus, anterior
and middle cingulate, bilateral cuneus and Crus I and II regions of the left cerebellum. The
(multiplicative) interaction between confidence and urgency was associated with a highly
similar statistical map, but was not associated with regions of the right medial and lateral
frontal cortex. This finding implies that the slope of activity associated with confidence did
not vary according to urgency, however it does not preclude the possibility that activity in
this region was additionally sensitive to an additive urgency signal (i.e., that activity in this
region tended to increase with urgency). Activity in bilateral occipital cortex, fusiform and
superior parietal lobe, as well as the left precentral motor cortex and right superior frontal
lobe covaried with decisional uncertainty (Table A.6; Figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.7. Classical Results: Confidence. A) Confidence (unsigned Cm-
LogLR). B) The multiplicative interaction between confidence and urgency.
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Figure 3.8. Classical Results: Uncertainty. Activity in bilateral occipital
lobe, fusiform, and superior parietal lobe was negatively correlated with con-
fidence. Highly similar statistical maps were obtained for the model tracking
the interaction with urgency.
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3.5.2.5. Urgency. As described above, for each of the four classical models, 2 PMs were
included per mean regressor. The first PM tracked an evidence variable (categorical evi-
dence or confidence), and the second PM tracked urgency. Whereas the first PM allowed
the investigation of multiplicative interactions between the evidence variable and urgency
(i.e., whether urgency modulates the slope of evidence variable), the second PM allowed the
investigation of additive e↵ects. As this regressor was orthogonalized with respect to the first
PM, overlap between the statistical maps associated with the first and second PMs provides
evidence that activity within these regions tracked the first PM and also tended to increase
with urgency. To identify regions associated with this orthogonalized representation, a con-
junction analyses was conducted for the contrast of urgency greater than implicit baseline
across each of the four classical models. The average t-values across these maps are reported
in Table A.7 and Figure 3.9.
Urgency was notably associated with the pre-SMA, bilateral cerebellum, right precuneus,
anterior and middle cingulate, right middle frontal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, and
a large region of the right inferior parietal lobe and supramarginal gyrus. Urgency was
also represented in widespread striatal regions, including the bilateral body of the caudate
and the ventral striatum. Right inferior parietal and medial frontal regions also notably
tracked decisional confidence (Table A.5; Figure 3.7), providing evidence that activity in
these regions tracked not only confidence, but also tended to increase with urgency.
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Figure 3.9. Urgency was modeled as a linearly-increasing signal that peaked
on the last step. It was included as the second PM in each model, and was
orthogonalized with respect to the first PM. This statistical map is the result
of a conjunction analysis across each of the four models (Table 3.1), and the
values reflect averaged t-values across these maps. Many of these regions
overlapped with those associated with the first PM of each model, providing
evidence of additive gain modulation of their representations.
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3.5.2.6. Feedback. During feedback several regions were sensitive to prediction errors re-
lated to the categorical evidence and confidence functions. Given a limited number of in-
correct trials, these analyses were limited to trials where participants made the normatively
correct choice. Given a limited number of trials, we constrained these analyses to trials where
participants made the normatively correct choice. Reward prediction errors was calculated
as:
(10) PredictionError = R  P (correct)
where R = 1 for positive feedback and R = 0 for negative feedback and P indicates the prob-
ability of a correct choice. To investigate e↵ector-specific prediction errors, P represented
the CmLogLR on the response step. To investigate e↵ector-independent prediction errors,
P represented the confidence (unsigned CmLogLR) on the last step.
It was predicted that regions involved in learning the contingencies between features and
specific motor responses would show positive prediction errors associated with categorical
evidence (Gershman et al., 2009; Samejima et al., 2005; Stalnaker et al., 2012), while regions
involved in learning the contingencies between features and rewarded outcomes, without
regard to specific e↵ectors, would show prediction errors related to decisional confidence
(Fiorillo et al., 2003).
Regions neighboring the central sulcus of right hemisphere showed e↵ector-specific pre-
diction errors (Table A.8; Figure 3.10.B). Mirroring the generally weaker results for the Right
category, no regions were found to track positive prediction error for the Left category. Ac-
tivity within regions in the right putamen (overlapping regions associated with confidence
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and its interaction with urgency), left caudate body, left insula, right frontal mid-orbital
gyrus, and the left crus I and bilateral crus II regions of the cerebellum, was consistent with
an e↵ector-independent reward prediction signal .
Figure 3.10. A) E↵ector-independent reward prediction error in the bilateral
head of the caudate, right putamen and cerebellum. B) E↵ector-specific pre-
diction error corresponding to the left response in left-cortical motor regions
and right precuneus. No regions sensitive to prediction errors corresponding
to the right response were identified.
3.5.3. RFX-BMS. While all voxels included in the RFX-BMS analyses surpassed classi-
cal significance thresholds, only moderate and strong e↵ects (PXP >= 0.8) will be discussed.
As shown in Figure 3.11(and in Tables A.9, Table A.10, and Table A.11), each individual
PM (categorical evidence, confidence, and uncertainty) was investigated individually with
the individual PM multiplied by urgency. For categorical evidence, there was strong evi-
dence that the slope of the representation of categorical evidence within bilateral cortical
somatomotor regions (peak PXP > 0.9) is multiplicatively modulated by urgency. In cere-
bellar lobule VI, however, this representation is more likely to be unmodulated by urgency
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(peak PXP = 0.8). In addition, there were trends (PXP > 0.8) for the putamen and pre-
motor and superior parietal regions to be better fit by the function that was not modulated
by urgency. For the confidence regressor, the right medial superior frontal gyrus was likely
unmodulated by urgency (peak PXP = .08), while activity in the right superior parietal lobe
(PXP > 0.8), right cuneus (peak PXP > 0.8) and right superior temporal pole (peak PXP
> 0.8) were likely modulated urgency. For uncertainty, no regions exceeded the criterion,
indicating no strong evidence about whether the slopes of the representations of uncertainty
were modulated by urgency or not.
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Figure 3.11. Model Comparison Results. Protected Exceedance Probability
(PXP) maps for the three pairs of models tested. Each map was thresholded
to include only voxels where the classical models provided the best fit. The
PXP indicates the probability that the model provided the best fit, relative
to the other models tested, above and beyond chance (Rigoux et al., 2014).
A) Green: Categorical Evidence; Warm colors: Categorical Evidence weighted
by urgency. Cortical somatomotor regions showed strong preference (PXP >
0.9) for the model tracking the multiplicative interaction between categori-
cal evidence and urgency. B) Green: Confidence; Warm colors: Confidence
weighted by urgency. C) Uncertainty was perfectly anticorrelated with Confi-




A temporally extended design was used to investigate how participants integrated prob-
abilistic featural information across time in order to make categorization decisions. Impor-
tantly, although most of the features were informative, they were not perfectly predictive.
This kind of probabilistic decision-making task is common in everyday life; environmental
cues often provide only incomplete information about the course of action that will lead
to a desired state. In order to interact advantageously with such environments, decision-
makers must assign weights to information sources according to a weighting scheme that
approximates the characteristics of the external environment (Craik, 1967). In the present
experiment, our goal was to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying our capacity
to integrate information across stimulus features of varying reliability, and to investigate
how we modulate this process based upon the time available to respond. Through use of
a model-based approach, the temporal evolution of three neural functions were di↵erenti-
ated: categorical evidence (the evidence for specific responses associated with the category),
decisional confidence (an abstract representation proportional to the probability of reach-
ing a desirable state), decisional uncertainty (the inverse of confidence), and urgency (a
monotonically-increasing signal representing an increasing pressure to respond within each
trial). The design also allowed investigation into how urgency might modulate the other
functions.
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4.1. Multi-Cue Integration and Categorization
A primary goal of our study was to examine how fundamental decision making mech-
anisms were adapted for categorical decision making. Through use of a probabilistic mul-
tiple cue categorization task, participants were encouraged to integrate information across
multiple stimulus dimensions. Previous research has indicated that in non-temporally ex-
tended versions of the task, participants frequently use simpler heuristic strategies, where
they consider only a subset probabilistic cues (e.g., considering only the cues that are most
informative; Gluck et al., 2002; Meeter et al., 2006, 2008). A logistic regression analysis
(Figures 3.3.B) provided evidence that participants in our tasks tended to use weighting
schemes that closely matched the normative logLR's which determined the probabilistic dis-
bursement of feedback (eq. 7). The temporally-extended nature of our paradigm, wherein
participants were exposed not only to the uncertainty associated with the informational con-
tent of the features, but also to the uncertainty about what features would comprise the
final stimulus, may have encouraged participants to consider each of the individual features
during deliberation.
The goal of the current study was to investigate the neural bases underlying the in-
tegration of probabilistic information. Accordingly, our design was intended to encourage
participants to integrate information across multiple stimulus dimensions. An important
domain for future research will to investigate how di↵erent environmental influences may
influence the use of di↵erent decision strategies. For instance, by providing incentive to
respond quickly (e.g., a points system as use in the pilot study), it would be possible to
encourage participants to consider only a subset of the stimulus features.
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4.2. Categorical Evidence
Somatomotor regions (primary motor cortex, pre- and post-central motor cortex, pos-
terior putamen, and cerebellum) tracked evidence (the cumulative logLR) towards specific
categories and their associated responses. Activity appeared to be e↵ector specific, with
primary activity contralateral to the hand used to make the categorical response. Activity
within cortical somatomotor regions, for instance, was positively correlated with evidence
towards the contralateral response, while activity within somatomotor regions of the cere-
bellum was positively correlated with evidence for the ipsilateral response, consistent with
the crossed nature of cortical-cerebellar projections. Previous studies have also found mo-
tor e↵ector specific activity in decision making tasks (Gluth et al., 2012; Selen et al., 2012;
Thura and Cisek, 2014; Tosoni et al., 2008; Wheeler et al., 2014). Of particular note are
two studies in humans using relatively high level decision making tasks. Gluth et al. (2012)
found that similar motor regions tracked decision evidence in a temporally-extended value-
based decision task, and Wheeler et al. 2014 found that motor regions were sensitive to
the rate at which information accumulated in a probabilistic feature task similar to ours.
Previous groups (e.g., Cisek, 2007; Thura and Cisek, 2014) have argued that such activity is
unlikely to be an epiphenomenal result of decision processes occurring upstream. Our results
strengthen this argument by providing evidence that activity in the right central sulcus (a
region strongly tracking evidence for a left response) was also re-instantiated as a positive,
e↵ector-specific prediction error during correct feedback (Table A.8; Figure 3.10); a signal
which likely served to increase the probability of making the same response in the future,
given similar stimuli.
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4.3. Confidence and Uncertainty
Signals related to decisional confidence have been previously identified in the striatum
(Ding and Gold, 2010), dopaminergic midbrain (Schwartenbeck et al., 2014), and in dorso-
lateral, rostrolateral, ventromedial and orbitofrontal cortical regions (Bowman et al., 2012;
De Martino et al., 2013; Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2011; Rolls et al.,
2010a,b; Tobler et al., 2007). Our results mirrored these results and indicated that the
DLPFC, RLPFC, and striatum tracked confidence. Additionally, regions of the ventral pari-
etal lobe, which have been previously associated with bottom-up attentional control (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002), tracked the temporal evolution of confidence (Figures 3.7 and 3.11.B).
Conversely, mirroring previous findings (White et al., 2012), the superior parietal lobe, which
has been previously implicated in top-down attentional control (Cabeza et al., 2008; Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002), tracked decisional uncertainty (Figures 3.8 and 3.11.C). Thus,
our results provide evidence that dorsal and ventral parietal regions covary with decisional
confidence, but may play opposing roles during deliberation.
Decisional confidence represents the choice-independent probability that a decision will be
correct, and was calculated as the unsigned CmLogLR. Our confidence regressor, therefore,
tracked the total amount of information accumulated from the amoeba stimulus, without
regards to specific motor responses. As analyses were limited to correct trials only, it provides
a normative estimate of the probability of transitioning to a desirable state (a state associated
with positive feedback), without regard to the specific action needed to obtain it. Such
predictions of reward provide the basis for calculation of reward prediction error (eq. 4),
and so may play an important role in reward-mediated learning. As participants were free
to respond at any time during each trial, such a function likely also provides an important
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signal indicating the value of accumulating additional evidence; when confidence is high,
the value of accumulating additional information is low, and vice versa. However, in the
present experiment, no incentives were provided for participants to respond early, and most
participants were fairly conservative in regards to their response timing (they showed a strong
tendency to respond on the last trial).
Decisional confidence may also modulate the use of di↵erent decisional strategies. For
instance, on di cult trials, confidence may also allow decision-makers to opt-out of di -
cult choices instead of gambling on uncertain information (Gherman and Philiastides, 2014;
Kepecs et al., 2008). As only one information source (the amoeba features) provided a
reliable source of information in our study, observed activity may have reflected the accu-
mulation of information for this exogenous information channel only. If multiple sources
of information were relevant, it is possible that other regions might have accumulated this
information. Signals related to confidence in particular sources may allow decision-makers
to shift between information channels based on their estimated reliability. For instance,
when confidence in a mnemonic information source is low, decision makers may tend to
place greater weight on perceptual channels, and vice versa (Hanks et al., 2011; Hutchinson
et al., 2014). This kind of precision-weighted competition may also underly switches between
di↵erent neural systems. In the COmpetition between Verbal and Implicit Systems model
(COVIS; Ashby et al., 2011), the competition between the explicit and procedural systems
is mediated by estimates of the reliability of each. An important goal for future research will




There are a number of ways that flexible adjustments to the SAT may be implemented in
the brain (for review, see Bogacz et al., 2010). One mechanism is analogous to manipulation
of the decision boundary itself; through modulation of the cortico-basal ganglia circuit. For
instance, excitation of the striatum may serve to lower thresholds by decreasing the tonic
inhibitory influences of the basal ganglia output nuclei (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990; Simen
et al., 2006). In support of this hypothesis, several previous studies have found that activity
in the pre-SMA and striatum covaries with emphasis on speed vs. accuracy (Forstmann et al.,
2008, 2010; Green et al., 2012; Ivano↵ et al., 2008; van Maanen et al., 2011; van Veen et al.,
2008). Additionally, individual di↵erences in connectivity between these regions predict
individual di↵erences in the capacity to flexibly modulate the SAT Forstmann et al. (2010).
Another hypothetical mechanism underlying flexible modulation of the SAT is analogous
to modulating the decision variable through gain modulation of neural activity associated
with the integration of categorical evidence (Furman and Wang, 2008; Salinas and Abbott,
1996; Standage et al., 2011, 2013; Thura and Cisek, 2014). Previous studies have provided
evidence that activity within regions associated with the integration of decisional evidence
shows neural gain well-accounted by this signal (e.g., Churchland et al., 2008; Thura and
Cisek, 2014), and several successful biologically-plausible decision-making models (e.g., Cisek
et al., 2009; Ditterich, 2006; Niyogi and Wong-Lin, 2013; Standage et al., 2011, 2013), have
demonstrated that such a signal represents an e↵ective way to modulate the SAT; one that
closely matches observed patterns of human behavior.
In the present experiment, the SAT was not manipulated. Instead, its temporal evolu-
tion was tracked the evolution of this monotonically-increasing urgency signal. This signal
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was strongly represented in the activity of the pre-SMA and striatum, regions previously
implicated in flexible modulation of the SAT. In addition to the additive urgency signal,
which increased the amplitude of the BOLD response across neuronal populations, urgency
modulated the slope of the neural representations of categorical evidence and confidence.
Therefore, urgency modulated two hypothetical mechanisms underlying flexible modulation
of the SAT: gain modulation of the striatal thresholding circuitry, and gain modulation of
the decisional evidence (see Bogacz et al., 2010, for review). Our results highlight similarities
between contrastive modeling approaches based on manipulations of contextual demands for
speed vs. accuracy (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2008), and the model-based approach applied
here.
Specifically, our findings are in accordance with extant evidence that urgency can mod-
ulate the temporal dynamics of deliberation by moving the system towards commitment
(e.g., Ditterich, 2006; Standage et al., 2011). It is important to note, however, that this
may not hold for all tasks. Hawkins and colleagues (2015), for instance, recently provided
evidence that across a range of perceptual decision-making tasks, behavioral performance
tends to be best accounted for by models that include stationary, rather than collapsing
decision boundaries (i.e., where the distance between the decision variable and the boundary
is not modulated by time). However, it is unclear whether the insights gained from the drift
di↵usion model (which was originally intended for decisions with short deliberative periods;
Ratcli↵ and Rouder, 1998) should be applied to paradigms where the information is pre-
sented in discrete epochs, where evidence for and against particular categories is modulated
within single trials, and where the final commitment to a behavioral response might be based
on several individual decisions.
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4.5. Conclusions
Real world environments often require decisionmakers to integrate information across
time and across multiple information sources. To do so e↵ectively, they must weight di↵er-
ent information channels according to their estimated reliability, and they must temper the
timing of their behavioral responses to maximize transient opportunities to reach desirable
states. In the present experiment, urgency modulated activity in regions known to be asso-
ciated with flexible modulation of the speed-accuracy trade-o↵, and also representations of
categorical evidence and confidence to match these demands on response timing. Emerging
evidence suggests that somatomotor recruitment during deliberation depends on knowledge
of the mapping between choice and response and that the specific regions recruited are
sensitive to manipulations of e↵ector modality (Ho et al., 2009; Tosoni et al., 2008). An
important goal for future research, therefore, will be to understand how we recruit di↵erent
neural populations during deliberation to support flexible cognitive control across variable
task environments.
4.5.1. Limitations.
4.5.1.1. Model Density. The present experiment employed a Bayesian logistic regression
analysis (Gelman et al., 2008) to characterize the strategies used by individual participants.
This analysis employes an uninformative Cauchy prior (mean = 0 for all coe cients) which
has the e↵ect of shrinking the majority of regression coe cients towards zero while oc-
casionally allowing large values. This general approach is applicable to a wide variety of
regression problems and has the advantage of avoiding overfitting while also being robust to
separation. However, particularly in high-dimensional real-world environments, the decision-
making behavior of cognitively-limited organisms might be better accounted for by models
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incorporating stronger priors for model sparsity. Such models would have the advantage of
positing reduced mnemonic demands (i.e., requiring that only information from relevant di-
mensions would be considered) and so would more closely model the use of low-dimensional
rule-based categorization strategies (e.g., Figure 1.1.B). A popular technique for encourag-
ing model sparsity involves regularization via a L1 norm. In a Bayesian framework, an L1
penalty can be included in the model by using a Laplacian prior. In a frequentist frame-
work, it can be included through use of the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator
(LASSO) penalty (Tibshirani, 1996). To avoid arbitrary decisions about the appropriate reg-
ularization strategy, future researchers might choose to use the elastic net (Zou and Hastie,
2005), a popular data-driven method to estimate the appopriated balance between L1 and
L2 (e.g., ridge regression) norms. Among its attractive features, this approach is known to
encourage the formation of sparse models (like the L1 penalty), but also tends to yield better
generalization performance than models including the L1 penalty.
An alternative approach to characterize idiosyncratic strategies is to employ “strategy”
analysis, which involves making strong assumptions about specific strategies that partici-
pants might use during the task. Previous researchers (e.g., Gluck et al., 2002; Meeter et al.,
2006), for instance, have used this approach to compare evidence for singleton strategies
(which involve consideration of only the most informative features), single-feature strate-
gies (which involve consideration of only single features), “intermediate” integrative strate-
gies (which involve integration of some information across features), and optimal strategies
(which involve integrating information across all available features). A drawback of this ap-
proach (relative to the regression analyses described in the previous paragraph) is that it is
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unable to identify strategies that were not predicted by the experimenter. This approach is
also unable to capture subtle di↵erences in the weights applied to di↵erent stimulus features.
4.5.1.2. Strategy Changepoints. When fit across entire experimental blocks, both regres-
sion and strategy analyses assume that participants have not switched between di↵erent
strategies during the experiment. To identify possible strategy changepoints (points at
which participants switch from one strategy to another), previous researchers have fit re-
gression and strategy analyses to data within rolling windows of arbitrary size (typically
20-40 trials; Meeter et al., 2006, 2008). As this approach blurs information across trials
within each window, a drawback of this approach is that it tends to provide imprecise es-
timates of strategy changepoints. Thus it also leads to imprecise characterization of the
strategies employed on either side of the changepoints. An alternative approach, which has
been used by Speekenbrink and colleagues (Speekenbrink et al., 2010), involves modeling
strategy switches as hidden Markov models. This approach allows probabilistic inference
about the precise locations of strategy changepoints, and thus allows estimation of the most
likely patterns of subjective strategy use across the entire experiment.
4.5.1.3. Manipulation of the SAT. Urgency is thought to play the important functional
role of modulating the temporal dynamics of the decision-making process to match contextual
demands for speed vs. accuracy. A simple prediction based on this framework would be that
the slope of the urgency signal should covary with demands for speed (i.e., a greater slope
would be predicted when speed is emphasized over accuracy). In the present experiment,
SAT demands were not manipulated, thus, to better establish the link between urgency and
modulation of the dynamics of decision making, future researchers may wish to test this
prediction. Additionally, as we found that urgency modulates representations of categorical
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evidence and confidence through multiplicative and additive functions, it seems likely that
urgency may serve to modulate other functions that influence the decision-making process.
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BOLD Blood Oxygen Level Dependent
CmLogLR Cumulative Log Likelihood Ratio
COVIS COmpetition between Verbal and Implicit Systems
DDM Drift Di↵usion Model
DLPFC Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex
FDR False Discovery Rate
FEF Frontal Eye Fields
FWE Familywise Error Rate
GPi Internal Segment of the Globus Pallidus
LIP Lateral Intraparietal Area
IPS Intraparietal Sulcus
MNI Montreal Neurological Institute
MT Middle Temporal Area
OFC Orbitofrontal Cortex
PM Parametric Modulator
PXP Protected Exceedance Probability
RFX-BMS Random E↵ects Bayesian Model Selection
RLPFC Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex
SAT Speed Accuracy Trade-O↵
SDT Signal Detection Theory
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SMA Supplementary Motor Area
SNc Substantia Nigra Pars Compacta
SPM Statistical Parametric Mapping
SSM Sequential Sampling Model
STN Subthalamic Nucleus
sWOE Subjective Weights of Evidence
TR Repetition Time
VLPFC Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex
VTA Ventral Tegmental Area
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Table A.1. Pilot Study: Power Analyses. “n” indicates the estimated num-
ber of participants required to reach acheive statistical power of 0.8, assuming
correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (q < 0.05).
PM x y z n Region BA
Categorical
Evidence -7 -6 68 13 Supp Motor Area L 6
(Left) -30 -3 67 15 Frontal Sup L 6
-40 -14 41 13 Postcentral L 3
-14 22 7 17 Caudate L -
-14 0 24 14 Caudate L -
4 -14 72 13 Supp Motor Area R 6
14 -3 72 15 Frontal Sup R 6
28 -57 -32 15 Cerebelum 6 R 37
50 -51 16 13 Temporal Mid R 21
Categorical
Evidence -35 6 32 12 Precentral L 44
(Right) 21 20 62 14 Frontal Sup R 8
-9 -24 69 29 Paracentral Lobule L 4
38 -61 58 15 Parietal Sup R 7
47 -71 27 16 Occipital Mid R 39
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Table A.2. Classical Results: Mean E↵ect of Features. For other contrasts,
the topological false discovery rate was used to account for multiple compar-
isons. However, this contrasts yielded more widespread activation, and so the
more stringent family-wise error (FWE) rate was used instead. (Contrast:
mean feature regressor > implicit baseline)
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Mean
Features 4528 34.5 -60.0 46.5 15.19 Angular R 7
-1.5 -78.0 49.5 11.05 Precuneus L 7
994 37.5 22.5 -7.5 13.66 Insula R 47
2700 4.5 24.0 40.5 12.95 Cingulum Mid R 32
383 22.5 -79.5 1.5 12.63 Lingual R 18
44 -28.5 -30.0 1.5 12.09 37
1039 -25.5 -75.0 -21.0 11.81 Cerebelum 6 L 18
709 -21.0 -79.5 4.5 11.69 Calcarine L 18
1290 -28.5 -49.5 39.0 11.20 Parietal Inf L 40
783 4.5 -1.5 27.0 10.88 Cingulum Mid R -
2411 10.5 -22.5 -4.5 10.75 Thalamus R -
708 25.5 12.0 55.5 9.92 Frontal Sup R 8
156 9.0 -69.0 -28.5 9.63 Vermis 7 -
109 28.5 45.0 -21.0 9.30 Frontal Mid Orb R 11
55 43.5 -72.0 -27.0 9.15 Cerebelum Crus1 R 19
34 -13.5 12.0 -6.0 9.08 Putamen L 25
240 -6.0 -73.5 -28.5 8.81 Cerebelum Crus1 L -
48 1.5 -36.0 -42.0 8.79 -
186 -34.5 16.5 1.5 8.75 Insula L 48
39 36.0 -42.0 -36.0 8.65 Cerebelum 6 R 37
43 55.5 -45.0 -13.5 8.51 Temporal Inf R 20
82 3.0 -54.0 -22.5 8.51 Vermis 4 5 -
11 -7.5 -39.0 19.5 8.19 Cingulum Post L 26
51 13.5 15.0 3.0 8.17 Caudate R 25
33 16.5 -102.0 1.5 8.11 Calcarine R 17
16 -18.0 -37.5 6.0 8.11 Hippocampus L 27
24 -36.0 -43.5 -34.5 8.02 Cerebelum Crus1 L 37
27 -28.5 -1.5 45.0 8.00 Precentral L 6
18 37.5 -78.0 -19.5 7.93 Cerebelum Crus1 R 19
77 42.0 37.5 21.0 7.71 Frontal Mid R 45
20 48.0 30.0 28.5 7.68 Frontal Inf Tri R 45
10 31.5 -58.5 -1.5 7.59 Fusiform R 37
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Table A.3. Classical Results: Task-Negative Activation. (Contrast: implicit
baseline > mean feature regressor)
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Task
Negative 8859 -3.0 46.5 -7.5 10.86 Frontal Mid Orb L 11
Activation -19.5 30.0 36.0 9.57 Frontal Mid L 9
(Baseline ¿ 1.5 4.5 -7.5 6.10 Olfactory L 25
Features) 1718 -42.0 -75.0 31.5 8.20 Occipital Mid L 39
518 -19.5 -13.5 -22.5 7.15 Hippocampus L 35
1939 55.5 -7.5 -18.0 7.09 Temporal Mid R 20
69.0 -28.5 10.5 5.11 Temporal Sup R 22
1834 -58.5 -12.0 -7.5 7.08 Temporal Mid L 22
1269 -58.5 -42.0 4.5 6.79 Temporal Mid L 22
255 -6.0 -54.0 10.5 6.64 Precuneus L 30
323 -52.5 27.0 0.0 6.55 Frontal Inf Tri L 45
258 27.0 -81.0 -36.0 6.52 Cerebelum Crus2 R -
396 -6.0 -43.5 37.5 6.41 Precuneus L 23
190 10.5 46.5 51.0 6.21 Frontal Sup Medial R 9
418 21.0 -13.5 -21.0 6.02 ParaHippocampal R 35
268 67.5 -9.0 30.0 5.84 Postcentral R 43
362 -40.5 27.0 -18.0 5.41 Frontal Inf Orb L 38
213 -4.5 -27.0 60.0 5.35 Paracentral Lobule L 4
93
Table A.4. Classical Results: Categorical Evidence and Categorical Evi-
dence (multiplicatively) modulated by Urgency.
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Categorical
Evidence 12316 40.5 -15.0 49.5 13.04 Precentral R 6
(Left) 28.5 -42.0 61.5 7.06 Postcentral R 2
4.5 3.0 55.5 5.68 Supp Motor Area R 6
1416 -13.5 -52.5 -19.5 6.94 Cerebelum 4 5 L 19
1299 37.5 -10.5 -1.5 6.70 Insula R 48
786 42.0 -21.0 24.0 5.95 Rolandic Oper R 48
337 52.5 3.0 4.5 4.72 Rolandic Oper R 48
Categorical
Evidence 1947 -36.0 -21.0 69.0 6.18 Precentral L 6
(Right) -57.0 -18.0 46.5 5.52 Postcentral L 3
Categorical
Evidence 12461 40.5 -15.0 49.5 11.57 Precentral R 6
by Urgency 22.5 -55.5 67.5 6.69 Parietal Sup R 5
(Left) 4.5 3.0 55.5 5.40 Supp Motor Area R 6
1443 -12.0 -52.5 -19.5 7.02 Cerebelum 4 5 L 19
1354 36.0 -9.0 -1.5 5.72 Putamen R -
Categorical




Table A.5. Classical Results: Confidence and Confidence (multiplicatively)
modulated by Urgency.
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Confidence
5427 -58.5 -43.5 39.0 11.86 Parietal Inf L 40
-58.5 -61.5 1.5 6.09 Temporal Mid L 37
8107 55.5 -36.0 45.0 11.07 SupraMarginal R 40
66.0 -46.5 10.5 8.53 Temporal Mid R 22
40.5 -69.0 40.5 5.48 Angular R 7
46026 9.0 -82.5 21.0 9.01 Cuneus R 18
-12.0 -30.0 36.0 8.10 Cingulum Mid L 23
22.5 18.0 10.5 7.33 Caudate R -
28.5 -18.0 3.0 7.32 Putamen R -
-34.5 3.0 13.5 7.12 Rolandic Oper L 48
46.5 46.5 1.5 7.08 Frontal Mid R 45
-46.5 -48.0 -33.0 6.93 Cerebelum Crus1 L 20
12.0 21.0 57.0 6.31 Supp Motor Area R 8
24.0 58.5 27.0 5.98 Frontal Mid R 46
6.0 -66.0 61.5 4.72 Precuneus R 7
376 -25.5 -43.5 28.5 6.26 -
327 -27.0 25.5 28.5 6.11 Frontal Mid L 48
227 64.5 -28.5 -15.0 5.27 Temporal Mid R 20
341 -27.0 52.5 27.0 5.11 Frontal Mid L 46
Confidence
by Urgency 6155 55.5 -37.5 45.0 9.32 SupraMarginal R 40
45.0 -40.5 -1.5 5.82 Temporal Mid R 21
5621 -58.5 -42.0 39.0 9.24 Parietal Inf L 40
-30.0 -64.5 9.0 6.06 19
21686 10.5 -27.0 34.5 8.23 Cingulum Mid R 23
22.5 18.0 10.5 7.44 Caudate R -
0.0 7.5 36.0 7.15 Cingulum Mid L 24
-22.5 -39.0 66.0 6.92 Postcentral L 3
-34.5 3.0 15.0 6.09 Rolandic Oper L 48
21.0 -40.5 69.0 5.18 Postcentral R 2
4.5 -6.0 72.0 4.65 Supp Motor Area R 6
46.5 24.0 -18.0 4.44 Frontal Inf Orb R 38
3358 9.0 -82.5 21.0 7.31 Cuneus R 18
629 -46.5 -48.0 -33.0 6.87 Cerebelum Crus1 L 20
396 -27.0 24.0 28.5 6.41 Frontal Mid L 48
1741 -3.0 -63.0 -15.0 6.08 Cerebelum 4 5 L 18
-33.0 -78.0 -40.5 4.85 Cerebelum Crus2 L -
1831 24.0 58.5 27.0 6.03 Frontal Mid R 46
9.0 30.0 54.0 5.79 Frontal Sup Medial R 8
886 51.0 33.0 3.0 5.89 Frontal Inf Tri R 45
555 -25.5 51.0 25.5 4.83 Frontal Mid L 46
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Table A.6. Classical Results: Uncertainty and Uncertainty (multiplica-
tively) modulated by Urgency
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Uncertainty
4908 42.0 -81.0 -4.5 11.76 Occipital Inf R 19
4628 -37.5 -82.5 -6.0 8.77 Occipital Inf L 19
320 -27.0 -4.5 42.0 7.53 Precentral L 6
520 19.5 -63.0 51.0 5.98 Parietal Sup R 7
186 -4.5 12.0 49.5 5.79 Supp Motor Area L 32
251 -22.5 -64.5 34.5 5.58 Occipital Mid L 7
147 -18.0 -61.5 55.5 5.32 Parietal Sup L 7
216 24.0 -1.5 48.0 5.29 Precentral R 6
Uncertainty
by Urgency 5172 42.0 -82.5 -4.5 10.70 Occipital Inf R 19
33.0 -48.0 -15.0 5.17 Fusiform R 37
5737 -31.5 -70.5 -13.5 9.72 Fusiform L 19
-22.5 -64.5 34.5 6.21 Occipital Mid L 7
329 -6.0 15.0 46.5 6.92 Supp Motor Area L 32
315 -27.0 -4.5 45.0 6.89 Precentral L 6
761 21.0 -61.5 49.5 6.83 Parietal Sup R 7
200 -42.0 1.5 30.0 6.20 Precentral L 44
218 25.5 0.0 49.5 5.38 Frontal Sup R 6
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Table A.7. Classical Results: Urgency. For the classical analyses, urgency
was included as the second PM in each model. This map represents the results
of a conjunction analysis across these models, and the t-values were averaged
across models.
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Urgency
79280 39.0 22.5 -10.5 12.92 Frontal Inf Orb R 47
4.5 -87.0 27.0 11.64 Cuneus L 18
4.5 33.0 34.5 11.14 Cingulum Mid R 32
-45.0 -69.0 -31.5 10.25 Cerebelum Crus1 L -
10.5 3.0 1.5 10.04 Pallidum R -
3.0 -18.0 28.5 9.40 Cingulum Mid R 23
43.5 13.5 36.0 9.29 Frontal Inf Oper R 44
1.5 -58.5 64.5 9.15 Precuneus R 7
-60.0 -42.0 45.0 7.63 Parietal Inf L 40
27.0 -69.0 -30.0 7.57 Cerebelum 6 R 19
-22.5 -31.5 -30.0 7.30 Cerebelum 4 5 L 37
21.0 -42.0 9.0 6.87 Precuneus R 37
6903 52.5 -42.0 45.0 9.35 SupraMarginal R 40
2007 55.5 -40.5 -6.0 8.70 Temporal Mid R 21
1881 -30.0 57.0 -12.0 7.94 Frontal Mid Orb L 11
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Table A.8. Classical Results: Feedback: Positive Prediction Errors Related
to Confidence and Categorical Evidence.
PM Size x y z t Region BA
Confidence
516 27.0 12.0 0.0 7.31 Putamen R -
641 -34.5 10.5 16.5 6.25 Insula L 48
2404 -16.5 -73.5 -27.0 6.10 Cerebelum Crus1 L 19
268 21.0 37.5 -7.5 5.67 Frontal Inf Orb R 11
283 36.0 -76.5 -40.5 4.87 Cerebelum Crus2 R -
Categorical
Evidence 2460 39.0 -18.0 52.5 6.54 Precentral R 4
(Left) 364 12.0 -33.0 -40.5 5.66 -
296 19.5 -69.0 21.0 4.83 Cuneus R 18
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Table A.9. RFX BMS Results: Categorical Evidence vs. Categorical Evi-
dence (multiplicatively) modulated by Urgency. Each map was thresholded to
include only voxels where the model provided the best fit.
Model Size x y z PXP Region BA
Categorical
Evidence 192 -3 -60 -21 0.80 Vermis 6 -
792 15 -30 51 0.75 Paracentral Lobule R -
42 -6 45 0.69 Precentral R 6
33 15 -18 0 0.71 Thalamus R -
141 27 -6 9 0.67 Putamen R 48
11 18 12 63 0.63 Frontal Sup R 6
25 51 3 9 0.62 Rolandic Oper R 48
Categorical
Evidence 817 42 -21 60 0.94 Precentral R 4
by Urgency 12 -9 75 0.52 Supp Motor Area R 6
240 -39 -24 63 0.93 Precentral L 4
23 3 -3 72 0.67 Supp Motor Area R 6
69 60 -24 18 0.66 SupraMarginal R 42
20 57 9 0 0.64 Rolandic Oper R 48
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Table A.10. RFX BMS Results: Confidence vs. Confidence (multiplica-
tively) modulated by Urgency. Each map was thresholded to include only
voxels where the model provided the best fit.
Model Size x y z PXP Region BA
Confidence
1991 12 30 42 0.80 Frontal Sup Medial R 32
-12 -27 51 0.76 Cingulum Mid L 4
0 -60 -18 0.71 Vermis 6 -
-45 -63 -39 0.64 Cerebelum Crus2 L -
727 18 3 12 0.73 -
544 -24 6 12 0.71 Putamen L 48
317 -42 -60 39 0.70 Angular L 39
279 45 -24 33 0.69 Postcentral R 48
65 36 42 0 0.69 47
21 24 51 -12 0.67 Frontal Mid Orb R 11
57 30 30 33 0.66 Frontal Mid R 46
22 -42 -6 18 0.64 Rolandic Oper L 48
37 -36 -81 -42 0.63 Cerebelum Crus2 L -
11 54 -51 -9 0.62 Temporal Inf R 37
19 57 -30 -15 0.60 Temporal Inf R 20
Confidence
by Urgency 741 33 -66 54 0.85 Parietal Sup R 7
63 -48 6 0.73 Temporal Mid R 21
461 6 -81 42 0.82 19
182 51 15 -9 0.80 38
508 21 57 30 0.79 Frontal Sup R 9
-3 21 63 0.74 Supp Motor Area L 8
54 36 -15 0.65 Frontal Inf Orb R -
100 -48 15 -9 0.75 Temporal Pole Sup L 38
44 -21 60 24 0.73 Frontal Sup L 10
168 -30 -72 -27 0.68 Cerebelum Crus1 L 19
30 0 -6 69 0.67 Supp Motor Area L 6
100 30 21 54 0.67 Frontal Mid R 8
375 -57 -60 9 0.66 Temporal Mid L 37
-60 -24 15 0.66 SupraMarginal L 42
28 33 60 -6 0.65 Frontal Sup Orb R 11
57 -27 -39 72 0.64 Postcentral L 1
238 0 27 24 0.64 Cingulum Ant L 24
3 -18 42 0.62 Cingulum Mid R 23
12 -36 -69 51 0.63 Parietal Sup L 7
78 24 3 -12 0.62 Amygdala R 34
24 33 -42 66 0.62 Postcentral R 2
42 9 -66 -12 0.62 Cerebelum 6 R 18
46 6 -48 72 0.62 Precuneus R 5
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Table A.11. RFX BMS Results: Uncertainty vs. Uncertainty (multiplica-
tively) modulated by Urgency. Each map was thresholded to include only
voxels where the model provided the best fit.
Model Size x y z PXP Region BA
Uncertainty
508 18 -81 -9 0.77 Lingual R 18
36 -48 -15 0.62 Fusiform R 37
56 15 -60 54 0.72 Precuneus R 5
558 -33 -75 -9 0.71 Occipital Inf L 19
35 -24 0 45 0.68 6
41 -9 12 48 0.67 Supp Motor Area L 32
26 24 -3 45 0.65 6
Uncertainty
by Urgency 54 -24 -63 54 0.70 Parietal Sup L 7
108 33 -87 -15 0.67 Occipital Inf R 19
28 30 -57 54 0.66 Parietal Sup R 7
32 -27 -87 27 0.65 Occipital Mid L 19
21 -48 3 36 0.63 Precentral L 6
12 51 -69 -3 0.63 Temporal Inf R 37
29 30 -87 27 0.62 Occipital Sup R 19
42 -33 -93 0 0.61 Occipital Mid L 18
17 -45 -78 -12 0.60 Occipital Inf L 19
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